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Redefining the Antitrust Labor Exemption
Daniel J. Gifford*
Congress urgently needs to reformulate the antitrust labor

exemption. Courts and legal scholars alike1 have largely neglected the legal significance of the impact of industry-wide collective bargaining on price-output decisions in concentrated
industries. They have, moreover, attended even less to the
skewing tendencies produced by the almost universally practiced seniority system on labor union bargaining strategies.
This Article contends that a coherent reconciliation of antitrust and labor policies requires significant modifications in the
content of labor negotiations in concentrated industries. Such a
* Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. I wish to express my appreciation to Professors Carl Auerbach, Stephen Befort, Laura Cooper, Daniel
Farber, Robert Hudec, Victor Kramer, Roger Park, and Leo Raskind for their
helpful comments on and criticisms of an earlier draft of this Article.
1. Although the authors direct their attention to matters other than the
subject of the present Article, useful background for the matters discussed in
the text can be found in Campbell, Labor Law and Economics, 38 STAN. L.
REV. 991 (1986); Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations: A Critique of
the New Deal Labor Legislation,92 YALE L.J. 1357, 1382 (1983); Leslie, Labor
BargainingUnits, 70 VA. L. REV. 353 (1984); Posner, Some Economics of Labor
Law, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 988 (1984). Professor Richard Epstein, in his overall
critique of the National Labor Relations Act, observes that an alternative to
the present labor policy might embrace as a goal the elimination of the
product-market effects of union organization. Epstein, supra,at 1384-85. Contrary to Epstein, the proposal contained in this Article would preserve labor's
power in the labor market but would mitigate the most restrictive productmarket effects of that power. Economists have explored labor union bargaining and bargaining strategies, but generally without specific recommendations
for legal change. Professor John Dunlop has explicitly discussed the effects of
product-market structure on collective bargaining. See J. DUNLOP, WAGE DETERMINATION

UNDER TRADE

UNIONS

74-94

(1944).

Professor Frederick

Warren-Boulton has examined a labor union's relations with an employer as a
particular manifestation of relations between an input supplier and an output
producer. See F. WARREN-BOULTON, VERTICAL CONTROL OF MARKETS: BusI-

NESS AND LABOR PRACTICES 119-60 (1978). During the late 1950s and early
1960s the collective bargaining process in oligopolistic industries was widely
discussed under the rubric of "administered pricing." See Auerbach, Administered Pricesand the Concentrationof Economic Power, 47 MINN. L. REV. 139,
173-76 (1962). The focus of that discussion was primarily on inflation. No proposals to redefine the labor exemption emerged from that discussion, so far as
the author is aware.
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development would further antitrust policies and, it is argued,
preserve the benefits to labor contemplated by the National Labor Relations Act. The modifications in the content of labor
negotiations under the reformulated labor exemption proposed
in this Article would benefit the public, many union members,
and other workers. These modifications would also increase
the range of economic opportunities available to blacks and
other minorities.
The argument for reform made here is not drawn solely
from the antitrust and labor fields, but also from the nation's
commitment to economic policies embodied in trade, civil
rights, and other laws. It concludes that, while the larger outlines of present labor-management negotiation practices can be
reconciled with the goals of those statutes, limited reform is
nonetheless urgently required. This Article proposes to reach
this needed reform through a redefinition of the antitrust labor
exemption.
The Article contends that collective bargaining for worker
compensation measured on an hourly wage basis exacerbates
the output-restrictive tendencies of concentrated industries. In
less than fully competitive industries, in which the principal
firms possess significant market power, industry-wide collective
bargaining for hourly-wage based compensation places the bargaining labor union in a position analogous to that of a monopoly input supplier selling to a monopoly output producer: the
union has an effective monopoly over industry-specific labor
and is, in effect, selling that labor to firms possessing power in
the product markets in which they sell. In significant parts of
industry, therefore, one monopoly is piled on top of another
with the result that output and employment in those industries
are unduly restricted.
The influence of the union seniority system upon a union's
approach to collective bargaining is likely to further exacerbate
this restrictive impact on output. The seniority system creates
a class of workers who-so long as their employers remain in
business-possess almost guaranteed lifetime employment,
whose fortunes are largely insulated from the cyclical fortunes
of their employers, and who have effectively cast the risks of
economic downturns upon others. Because these workers tend
to form the core of union membership, union bargaining objectives tend to weight their interests inordinately high vis-a-vis
the interests of less senior union members or labor interests as
a whole.
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Collective bargaining negotiations are generally conducted
on an industry-by-industry basis and focus on worker compensation based on an hourly-wage standard. This bargaining
method has transformed the profits earned in periods of prosperity by efficiently operated (albeit concentrated) industries
into permanent, higher wage costs. This effect tends systematically to erode or destroy the comparative advantage of those industries in international trade. For those industries, this
bargaining method has thereby tended to destroy or shrink potential markets and concomitantly to reduce their levels of
employment.
Because the bargaining processes described tend to affect
mass-production industries that add substantial value to their
raw material inputs, they are the very industries that reward
their workers with above-average compensation. Reduced employment in these industries forces workers who might otherwise earn these higher wages to seek lower paying employment
elsewhere. Blacks and other minority groups who constitute a
significant proportion of the working class in the industrial cen2
ters of the northeast and midwest bear much of this burden.
The general public suffers to the extent that the potential productivity of the nation's resources is not fully employed.
The public also suffers from the delay in the full social and
economic integration of blacks and other minorities imposed by
these practices. Since mass-production industries typically provide high levels of compensation for jobs whose educational
qualificiations are low, a diminishing competitive position for
those industries partially blocks an important path for minorities and the educationally disadvantaged to enter into rewarding employment. Generations of earlier disadvantaged
classes had used that path, now increasingly out of reach to the
disadvantaged, as a means to transform themselves, over one or
two generations, into the middle class. As a result the present
state of affairs aggravates racial and class conflict and diminishes the level of overall economic well-being of society. Present labor policy has thus come into conflict with the goals of
the civil rights acts and the full employment acts.
The antitrust laws have embraced the principle of allocative efficiency. This same principle underlies United States
trade policy. In both instances the principle is used as a guide
towards policies furthering this nation's economic betterment.
Other national laws-in particular, title VII of the Civil Rights
2.

See W. WiLsON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED 134-35 (1987).
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Act of 19643 and the Full Employment and Balanced Growth
Act of 1978 4 -- have as their objectives the full inclusion of women and minorities in the class of those who benefit from the
nation's economic growth. The reform urged would further the
allocative efficiency goals of antitrust law at the same time that
it maximizes labor's returns from collective bargaining. It
would also further national goals concerned with trade, growth,
and social integration.
I.
A.

THE POLICIES BEHIND THE PRESENT-DAY LAW
ANTITRUST LAW

Whatever may once have been thought about the objectives
underlying the antitrust laws, most courts and scholars agree
that the ultimate goal of the antitrust laws is the enhancement
of consumer welfare. The prohibitions against trade restraints
and monopolization contained in antitrust laws are not ends in
themselves: they also advance the economic enrichment of society, an ultimate purpose that is often stated in the language of
furthering consumer welfare.
This present-day appreciation of the underlying consumer
welfare goal of antitrust is a relatively new development. Only
forty years ago Judge Learned Hand boldly asserted that the
antitrust laws contained social engineering imperatives. In his
famous opinion in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America
(Alcoa),5 he suggested that the antitrust laws were designed at
least in part to foster a reorganization of industry into "a system of small producers."'6 Moreover, he asserted that an industrial organization of this kind was desirable in and of itself,
regardless of its efficiency, or in other words, regardless of its
7
lesser ability to satisfy consumer needs or wants.
Indeed, as late as 1962 the United States Supreme Court
ruled in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States8 that the efficiencies
3.

Pub. L. No. 8-352, Title VII, 78 Stat. 253 (codified as amended at 42

U.S.C. §§ 2 0 0 0 e-200 2 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)).
4. Pub. L. No. 95-523, 92 Stat. 1887 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 3101-3152 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
5. 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945).

6. Id. Judge Hand also asserted that "[t]hroughout the history of these
[antitrust] statutes it has been constantly assumed that one of their purposes
was to perpetuate and preserve, for its own sake and in spite of possible cost,
an organization of industry in small units which can effectively compete with
each other." Id. at 429.

7. Id.
8. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
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achieved by a shoe manufacturer's vertical integration into distribution were reason to condemn a corporate merger under
section 7 of the Clayton Act, because those efficiencies would
disadvantage unintegrated independent distributors.9 The public, under the Court's ruling, would pay more for shoes to preserve the viability of a class of independent merchants, whose
existence was apparently desirable in itself.
Since the late 1970s, however, a substantial consensus has
emerged among antitrust scholars and judges that the antitrust
laws call not for competition as an end in itself, but for competition with a purpose-the promotion of economic efficiency
and hence the satisfaction of consumer wants at the lowest
cost.10 Competitive markets achieve an efficient provision of
goods and services through the furtherance of both allocative
and productive efficiency. Industries attain productive efficiency when they employ inputs in such combination as to maximize output, or produce goods and services through the least
cost method of production. Society achieves allocative effi9. Id. at 344. In ruling that the efficiencies created by vertical integration constituted a ground for condemning the merger of a manufacturer with a
retailer, the Court statedThe retail outlets of integrated companies, by eliminating wholesalers
and by increasing the volume of purchases from the manufacturing
division of the enterprise, can market their own brands at prices below those of competing independent retailers.... [Such] expansion is
not rendered unlawful by the mere fact that small independent stores
may be adversely affected. It is competition, not competitors, which
the Act protects. But we cannot fail to recognize Congress' desire to
promote competition through the protection of viable, small, locally
owned businesses. Congress appreciated that occasional higher costs
and prices might result from the maintenance of fragmented industries and markets. It resolved these competing considerations in favor
of decentralization.

Id.
10. See R. BoRx, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX (1978); 1 P. AREEDA & D.
TURNER, ANTIrnUST LAW 7-14, 31-33 (1978). Judge Robert Bork understands

the maximization of consumer welfare to mean the maximization of the combination of consumer and producer surplus. See R. BORK, supra, at 110; intfra
note 11. Although in general agreement with these writers, Judge Richard
Posner believes that in addition to the deadweight social loss produced by monopolistic practices, those practices tend to produce a further loss which is
often overlooked the diversion of social resources into the task of creating or
maintaining monopolies. R. POsNER, ANTITRUST LAW 2-22 (1976). For dissenting views, see Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust. A New Equilibrium, 66
CORNELL L. REv. 1140, 1140 (1981); Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MIcH. L. REv. 213 (1985). Although Professor Eleanor Fox argues
that efficiency is not the sole or ultimate goal of antitrust law, she nonetheless
would accord that goal substantial weight when not in conflict with long-run
consumer interests. See Fox, supra, at 1179-83.
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ciency when overall societal resources are routed in ways that
maximize consumer satisfaction. 1
This unidimensional understanding of the antitrust laws is
compatible with the view that society has goals other than economic efficiency. Likewise, it acknowledges the historical reality that other such goals can be found articulated in the
legislative history of these laws and have been manifested in
the decisions of some cases. The consensus merely reflects the
belief that, without the single purpose of economic efficiency,
the antitrust laws are effectively inadministrable.
Judge Bork helped significantly to build this present-day
consensus with his book, The Antitrust Paradox,'2 in which he
forcefully argued that only economic efficiency provided a lodestar for judges to resolve antitrust disputes. 13 He argued that if
the antitrust laws were deemed to contain other-largely undefined-social purposes, judges would be left with vast, unguided
discretion in deciding antitrust cases. Indeed, that discretion
would, in effect, call for them to incorporate their own individual social theories into the administration of the antitrust
laws.' 4 This was what Judge Hand had done in Alcoa and what
a majority of the Court had done in Brown Shoe. Thus even in
using a superficially simple, nonefficiency purpose like the
preservation of small merchants-the rationale in Brown
Shoe-judges would be left without guidance as to when, in
what circumstances, and at what economic cost to society, the
goal of preserving small merchants should prevail and when
competing considerations should outweigh it. The judiciary can
11. When antitrust commentators refer to the furtherance of consumer
welfare as the ultimate objective of antitrust law, their remarks are sometimes
misunderstood. Judge Bork has used that phrase as synonymous with the furtherance of productive and allocative efficiency. In that use, consumer welfare
is equated with the enrichment of society, regardless of which particular
groups or classes within that society benefit. In this manner of speaking con-

sumer welfare is said to increase when increased efficiencies from a corporate
merger increase overall wealth, even though that additional wealth takes the
form solely of enhanced profits. Moreover, such a merger would be said to enhance consumer welfare even if consumer surplus were reduced as a result of
higher prices. See R. BORK, supra note 10, at 107-15. Professor Oliver Williamson has also argued that the allocative efficiency effects of business transactions are, at least in general, more important than their income distribution
effects. See Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense Revisited, 125 U.
PA. L. REV. 699, 711 (1977); Economies As An Antitrust Defense: The Welfare
Tradeoffs, 58 AM. ECON. REv. 18, 27-28 (1968).
12. R. BORK, supra note 10.
13. Id. at 28.
14. Id. at 409-10.
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obtain the guidance needed only by construing the antitrust
laws as embodying the single purpose of fostering economic efficiency through the preservation of competition.' 5
Under this consensus the pursuit of social goals other than
the furtherance of economic efficiency requires legislation separate from the antitrust laws or modifying those laws for a specific purpose. Through legislation, Congress has often pursued
such purposes, even in areas impinging upon core antitrust
concerns. For example, through the patent laws,'16 Congress
has restricted short-run competition to promote product and
process innovations. Likewise, in the enactment of the
Robinson-Patman Act of 1936,17 Congress provided protection
to small business against larger, more efficient chain stores and
8
mass merchandise distributors.'
The statutory and nonstatutory labor exemptions constitute restrictions on the scope of the antitrust laws particularly
relevant to this Article. Through these exemptions, Congress
and the courts have largely eliminated competition in the labor
market (or the lack thereof) from the scope and hence the concern of the antitrust laws. Congress intended the antitrust laws
to foster competition in product markets but to ignore competition in labor markets, regardless of the effect that a lack of
competition in labor markets had upon manufacturing costs.
This Article argues for reconceptualizing the labor exemption. In restating the way antitrust laws should be reconciled
with the nation's labor laws, it is, of course, necessary to
broaden the inquiry beyond a concern for economic efficiency,
because the labor laws have incorporated nonefficiency values.
Fortunately, however, the approach recommended here not
only achieves a superior reconciliation between antitrust and
labor policies; it also furthers a broad spectrum of other national goals. Moreover, the recommended approach furthers
these goals by removing the restraints on output which impede
market mechanisms from allocating resources in an efficient
manner. A broad confluence of national policy objectives, as
well as the most basic concern of antitrust policy, support the
15. For a short but trenchant critique of the Alcoa and Brown Shoe opinions, see P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 10, at 9-12.

16. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-293 (1982).
17. Ch. 592, 49 Stat. 1526-28 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a (1982)).
18. See, e.g., Gifford, Assessing Secondary-Line Injury Under the
Robinson-Patman Act. The Concept of "Competitive Advantage," 44 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 48, 51 (1975).
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recommended approach. 19
B.

UNITED STATES TRADE POLICY

United States trade policy has changed drastically in the
last century. From a highly protectionist stance in the early
part of the century, the United States since the end of World
War II has followed a course of encouraging international
trade. In 1947 the United States, with other developed nations,
helped to organize the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade
(GATT), 20 a negotiation and agreement framework used collectively by the developed and developing nations to reduce tariffs
and other trading barriers. Since its founding the GATT has
formed a cornerstone of United States trade policy. Congress
has enacted several major pieces of legislation to assist in carrying out the progressive lowering of tariffs contemplated by the
GATT.2 1 Although the United States has taken a protectionist
position in a number of well-publicized cases, various administrations and congressional leaders have repeatedly affirmed an
overall national policy favoring the progressive elimination of
trade barriers.
The United States' goal of lowering tariff and other trading
barriers at home and of encouraging other nations to take similar steps is premised upon certain assumptions widely shared
among economists and policymakers. Those assumptions,
which are intimately related to the theory of comparative ad19. That the proposed reformulation of the labor exemption is consistent
not only with antitrust policy but with the furtherance of a broad range of
legal objectives is a powerful argument for its acceptance as implicit in the
body of existing law. Professor Ronald Dworkin argues that wide-ranging consistency with past and contemporaneous authorities supports the validity of a
judge's interpretation. R. DWORKIN, LAw's EMPIRE 225-27 (1986); see also T.
KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF ScIENTIFIc REvoLuTioNs 144-59 (2d ed. 1970) (important reason why new scientific paradigm replaces another is former's better
"fit" with wide range of existing data).
20. Opened for signature Oct 30, 1947, 61 Stat A3, TIAS. No. 1700, 55
U.N.TS. 187 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1948).
21. See, e.g., Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, 98 Stat. 2948
(codified in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.); Trade Agreements Act of 1979,
Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2501-2582 (1982)); Trade
Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2487
(1982)); Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, 76 Stat. 872 (codified
as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1982 (1982)); Trade Agreements Extension
Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-686, 72 Stat. 673 (codified in scattered sections of 19
U.S.C.); Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1955, Pub. L. No. 84-86, 69 Stat.
162 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.).
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vantage, 22 are that all nations are enriched under a regime of
free trade; that consumer satisfaction is the ultimate goal of
trade; and that this satisfaction is maximized when consumer
needs and wants are satisfied at the lowest cost. Assumptions
about allocative efficiency underlie United States trade policy.
In this case these assumptions relate to the world's resources:
the world is enriched when its resources are allocated in such a
way as to satisfy consumer needs and wants at the lowest cost.
Thus the assumptions underlying United States trade policy are
similar or identical to those underlying the United States anti23
trust laws.
C. ANTDisCRIMINATION ACTS
In other major statutes, Congress has set forth economic
objectives that must be reconciled with the objectives of present American labor policy. Through title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,24 Congress outlawed employment discrimination based upon race or sex. In so doing Congress intended
to draw blacks, other minorities, and women into full participation in the nation's economic life. 25 In the Employment Act of
194626 and the Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of
1978,27 Congress endorsed economic policies that would provide
full employment. In the latter Act, Congress also endorsed the
view that attaining full employment would achieve the goals of
title VII.2 8
22. For a discussion of the theory of comparative advantage, see P.
SAMUELsON, ECONoMIcs, 626-50 (11th ed. 1980).

23. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
24. Pub. L. No. 8-352, Title VII, 78 Stat. 253 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2002 (1982 & Supp. 11 1985)).
25. The legislative history of title VII includes explicit recognition of the
economic waste that had been incurred as a result of the exclusion of blacks
from that economic life. One group of Representatives observed that as a result of discrimination in employment, "the country is burdened with added
costs for the payment of unemployment compensation, relief, disease, and
crime," and that because of that discrimination, "American industry is not obtaining the quantity of skilled workers it needs." H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 28, reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.

NEws 2391, 2515 (additional views on H.R. 7152 of Reps. McCulloch, Lindsay,
Cahill, Shriver, MacGregor, Mathias, and Bromwell).

26. Feb. 20, 1946, ch. 33, 60 Stat. 23 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1021-1025 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).

27. Pub. L. No. 95-523, 92 Stat. 1887 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 3101-3152 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
28. Among the Congressional findings supporting the Full Employment
and Balanced Growth Act of 1978 were the following- "Increasing job opportunities and full employment would greatly contribute to the elimination of dis-
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The assumptions underlying these Acts are not as precise
as those underlying antitrust and trade policy. They are not so
clearly premised upon a commitment to allocative efficiency.
As the Article will demonstrate, however, the policies set forth
in title VII and in the Employment Acts become increasingly
more effective as allocative efficiency is furthered.
D.
1.

LABOR LAW
The Goal of Collective Bargaining

American labor policy is contained in a number of separate
statutes, all of which Congress designed to facilitate worker organization or to prevent legal institutions from impeding such
organization. The most important of these statutes is the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), first enacted in 1935,29 and
substantially modified in the Taft-Hartley Amendments of
1947.30 The stated rationale underlying the National Labor Relations Act is the promotion of industrial peace.31 It has been a
tenet of labor policy that workers and employers can not only
resolve their differences peacefully through the collective bargaining process, but that the collective bargaining process is the
32
most effective means for resolving those differences.
Worker organization and the collective bargaining which it
facilitates, however, restrain the operation of the marketplace.
Not only do these restraints directly affect the labor market,
they can also significantly affect product markets when wage
bargaining is conducted on an industry-by-industry basis. 33 To
the extent that labor market restraints induce monopoly-like
effects in product markets, the labor policy that tolerates or encourages these restraints apparently conflicts with the general
crimination based upon sex, age, race, color, religion, national origin, handicap,
or other improper factors." 15 U.S.C. § 3101(b)(4) (1982).
29. Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169
(1982)). The Wagner Act was designed to preserve and to expand the policy
protecting worker organization contained in section 7(a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 73-67, 48 Stat. 195, 198-99 (1933). During most
of the preceding half century, Congress had enacted various pieces of legislation designed to further collective bargaining. See, e.g., Act of Oct. 1, 1888, ch.
1063, 25 Stat. 501 (creating arbitration boards for labor disputes of railroads
and other common carriers).
30. Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1982)).
31. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982) (findings and declaration of policy of Act).
32. Id.
33. See infra notes 81-86 and accompanying text.
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national policy favoring free markets.3 4 Indeed, this nation's labor policies appear to be in conflict with the goals of allocative
35
efficiency that underlie its antitrust laws and trading policies.
This very different policy for labor relations, therefore, calls for
special inquiry and justification in light of these other potentially competing economic goals. Despite the apparent differences between the nation's labor and other economic policies,
however, those differences are not accidental: present labor
policy is the result of decades of development.
2.

The Evolution of Labor Policy: From Common Law
Hostility to Government Protection and Supervision

Because the early common law as well as the Sherman Act
had embraced a free-market policy, the courts-especially the
federal courts-tended to view the labor movement unsympathetically in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 36 Judges perceived unions as trade restraints. Their early
the scope of
antitrust decisions included labor unions within
37
Act.
Sherman
the
by
prohibited
restraints
trade
34. See infra notes 59-66 and accompanying text.
35. The conflict is not limited to the labor market, in which Congress
sought to facilitate collective bargaining by workers, but extends into the product markets. When a union controls the supply of industry-specific labor, it is
able to create restraints in the product market that are identical to those that
would be brought about by a producer cartel. See infra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
36. Cases holding labor unions subject to Sherman Act prohibitions are
cited infra note 37. Even apart from issues arising under the antitrust laws,
the United States Supreme Court evidenced a general hostility to labor unions
during this period. In Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908), the Court
held unconstitutional a statute prohibiting rail carriers from discriminating
against an employee because of his union membership. Id. at 174-75. Similarly, in Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915), the Court held invalid a state
statute prohibiting employers from requiring employees not to belong to labor
unions. Id. at 11.
37. See, e.g., Duplex Printing Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 478-79 (1921)
(union boycott of employer's products violates Sherman Act, as amended by
Clayton Act); Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274, 301-09 (1908) (union members'
boycott of hat manufacturer violates Sherman Act); United States v. Debs, 64
F. 724, 745, 755 (N.D. III. 1894) (strike and boycott against use of Pullman cars
violates Sherman Act), affd on other grounds sub. nom, In re Debs, 158 U.S.
564 (1895); United States v. Workingmen's Amalgamated Council, 54 F. 994,
995-96, 999-1000 (E.D. La.) (injunction against strike under Sherman Act
proper even though strike has ended), affd, 57 F. 85 (5th Cir. 1893).
After the enactment of §§ 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act, the Supreme Court
continued to limit the number of pickets allowed at each gate on the ground
that such limitation was necessary to ensure that nonunion members were not
coerced. See American Steel Foundaries v. Tri-City Cent. Trades Council, 257
U.S. 184, 206 (1921) (allowing one striker or sympathizer at each gate). In
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In response to this judicial perception of unions as restraints of trade, in 1914 Congress specifically provided in section 6 of the Clayton Act that labor unions were not to be "held
or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the antitrust laws." 38 In section 20 of
the Clayton Act, Congress prohibited the courts from issuing
injunctions or restraining orders against strikes, worker boycotts, and other typical labor union activities. 39 Congress enacted the Norris-LaGuardia Act 4° in 1932, largely divesting the
issue injunctions and refederal courts of jurisdiction to
41
disputes.
labor
in
orders
straining
Clearly, therefore, even before the enactment of the National Labor Relations Act and its immediate predecessor, section 7(a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act, Congress had
rejected atomistic competition as a governing legal norm for labor markets: it had repeatedly approved of the kind of restraints in the labor market that collective bargaining
necessarily entails.
Congress has not, however, explicitly approved of collective
bargaining on an industry-wide scale.4 Indeed, the full ramifications of industry-wide collective bargaining---especially on
concentrated industries-have never been carefully evaluated
or debated in the political arena.
3.

The Wagner Act

The authors of the Wagner Act intended it to preserve and
expand the policy protecting worker organization contained in
Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921), the Supreme Court held invalid under
the equal protection clause an Arizona statute modeled upon § 20 of the Clayton Act. The Court partially justified its decision on the basis that the Arizona
courts construed it more broadly than § 20 had been construed in American
Steel Foundaries. Id. at 340-41.
38. Pub. L. No. 63-212, § 6, 38 Stat. 730, 731 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 17
(1982)).
39. Id. § 20, 38 Stat. at 738 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1982)).
40. Pub. L. No. 72-65, 47 Stat. 70 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1982)).
41. See id. § 7, 47 Stat. at 71-72 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 107 (1982)) (no jurisdiction for injunctive relief unless various criteria met).
42. Campbell, supra note 1, at 1054-56; see also C. SuMMERS, H. WELLINGTON & A. HYDE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAw 650 (2d ed. 1982). The
National Labor Relations Act mentions as appropriate bargaining units "the
employer unit, craft unit, plant unit or subdivision thereof." NLRA § 9(b), 29
U.S.C. § 159(b) (1982). The failure of a proposal to condemn multi-employer
bargaining at the time of the enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act is described in
Campbell, supra note 1, at 1055-56.
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section 7(a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA),4 3
the New Deal's first major effort to bring the nation out of the
depths of the Great Depression. The NIRA was designed to impose a cartel-like structure upon American industry through
which boards of industry and government leaders would govern
both prices and production." The underlying premise of NIRA
was that government action was needed to bring prices to levels
above costs, thereby creating conditions conducive to production.45 The context in which they were enacted, therefore, suggests that the labor provisions of the NIRA were designed to
allocate to labor a portion of the cartel profits generated from
price-output restrictions.4
When the New Deal's governing philosophy later began to
back away from an output restriction policy,47 its basic approach towards protecting and encouraging union organization
and collective bargaining remained intact. It became necessary,
therefore, to enact separate legislation, incorporating the objectives of section 7(a), when it became apparent that the NIRA
would not survive constitutional challenge. Senator Wagner
and other backers of the new legislation repeatedly referred to
the role of that legislation in raising the overall level of
wages. 48 Yet the legislative history of the Wagner Act does not
reveal any consideration of the extent to which labor organizations would be empowered to wield monopoly power in the
product markets in Which employers sold.
The Wagner Act's pursuit of unionization and collective
bargaining was at least in substantial part overtly based on a social cost rationale. The Act's findings refer to the disruptions
of the nation's economic life caused by industrial unrest,49 and
43. Ch. 90, § 7(a), 48 Stat. 195, 198-99 (1933), declared unconstitutional in
A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 541-51 (1935).
44. See J. FREDERICK, A PRIMER OF "NEw DEAL ECONOMICS" 101-03
(1933); Gifford, The New Deal Regulatory ModeL" A History of Criticisms and
Refinements, 68 MINN. L. REV. 299, 300-07 (1983).
45. See Gifford, supra note 44, at 300-01.
46. See ic at 301; J. FREDERICK, supra note 44, at 89-90; see also 79 CONG.
REC. 7567-68 (1935) (remarks of Sen. Wagner) (discussing policy of recovery
program and § 7(a) of NIRA).
47. See, A. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE POLITIcs OF UPHEAVAL 291-302, 385
(1960).
48. 79 CONG. REC. 7567-68 (1935) (statement of Sen. Wagner); 78 CONG.
REc. 9060-61, 12,018 (1934) (statements of Rep. Carpenter and Sen. Wagner);
see Hearings on S. 1958 Before Senate Comm. on Education and Labor, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess. 34-36 (1935) (statement of Sen. Wagner).
49. Ch. 372, § 1, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 151
(1982)).
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the Senate Report accompanying the Wagner Act recited annual losses exceeding one billion dollars (in dollars of the early
1930s) due to strikes.50 Congress, in the Wagner Act, sought to
channel labor unrest away from strikes and into collective bargaining, thereby enhancing the production process. 51
These congressional findings tend to obscure significant
normative judgments incorporated in the enacted legislation.
The costs of strikes and other labor disruptions that the Act
sought to reduce were probably less than the costs that the Act
itself would impose upon society. The stated purpose of the Act
was to substitute collective bargaining for strikes. But if
labor-management disputes could have been settled at lesser
cost to both parties through collective bargaining, the parties,
as rational economic actors, would have employed that process
long before the government intervened under the Wagner Act.
If both labor and management were trying to enhance their
own economic interests, strikes would occur52 only when one
party misjudged the constraints on the other.
Thus Congress was motivated by a purpose other than the
reduction of social costs when it enacted the Wagner Act. The
most apparent alternative goal would have been to raise
wages-a goal which the legislative history, in fact, shows was
shared by many of the Act's supporters. 53 Many members of
50. S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1935); see also Hearingson S.
1958 Before Senate Comm. on Education and Labor, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 36
(1935) (statement of Sen. Wagner) (32,000,000 man-days lost due to labor controversies in 1933 and 1934).
51. This social-cost reduction rationale for promoting collective bargaining
could be restated as an efficiency justification of sorts, because productive efficiency consists of cost reduction. Of course, it was not truly an efficiency justification because-as the text points out-if labor-management disputes could
have been settled at lesser cost to both parties through collective bargaining,
the parties as rational economic actors would have employed that process
without the need for government intervention.
52. This congressional approach of encouraging conditions conducive to
wage increases that would ultimately be passed on to the public had been foreshadowed by the various railway labor acts. Under these acts Congress encouraged collective bargaining in the railroad industry. To the extent that
those acts substituted wage increases resulting from collective bargaining for
strikes, it substituted a result that-as measured by the marketplace-was socially more costly than the alternative. Congress therefore must have made
the normative judgment that increased wage levels in the railroad industry
were justified and that the burden of those increased wage levels properly
ought to be borne by consumers. Because railroad rates were regulated, Congress may have anticipated that the Interstate Commerce Commission would
act as a check upon excessive labor costs by refusing to allow them as legitimate expenses in the rate-setting process.
53. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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Congress perceived wages as unduly low and saw the Wagner
Act as a device for raising them. By protecting workers' rights
to organize and by compelling employers to bargain with organized workers, the Act significantly altered the context in which
wages were set and shifted significant new power to organized
labor. Congress fully appreciated that the establishment of a
new relationship between labor and management was not
merely a procedural action. Rather, it anticipated that the new
procedural context would produce higher wages overall and
that consumers would necessarily bear the burden of those
higher wages.
At least some of those who supported the enactment of the
Wagner Act shared another, more sophisticated, goal-the redistribution of income from shareholders to workers. In the
view of some, the Great Depression resulted from a failure of
demand. Professor Rexford Tugwell, one of the early so-called
"brain trusters," had argued along with others that although
productivity had increased significantly during the 1920s, wages
had not kept pace.- Because workers as people with lower net
income had a higher propensity to consume than had the
wealthier classes, some theorists thought that routing more of
the monetary returns from production to labor and less to capital would raise overall demand. Many who took this view saw
the fostering of unionization as a means of stimulating demand
by raising wages. 55
54. See A. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE COMING OF THE NEW DEAL 123 (1959).
Senator Wagner complained that although technological changes increased the
productivity of workers in manufacturing by 71% from 1919 to 1933, workers'
share in the product created by manufacturing fell from 42% to 36% in the
same period. The Senator also complained that wages had not risen sufficiently to create a demand adequate to absorb the large increases in production which had occurred during the 1920s. In support of that complaint, he
asserted that the 10% rise in wages which had occurred during the period from
1922 to 1929 was vastly outdistanced by the 91% increase in the production of
machinery and the 70% increase in the production of capital equipment which
had occurred during the same period. See 79 CONG. REC. 7567 (1935).
55. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1935); 79 CoNG. REC.
7567-68 (1935) (remarks of Sen. Wagner); 78 CONG. REc. 9061, 12,018 (1934)
(statements of Rep. Carpenter and Sen. Wagner); see also Epstein, supra note
1, at 1363 (income redistribution was a consequence of the Wagner Act). Congress's ultimate acceptance of the view that fostering unionization stimulates
aggregate demand by raising wages is present in the findings and policies of § 1
of the NLRA:
The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not
possess full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract, and
employers who are organized in the corporate or other forms of ownership association substantially burdens and affects the flow of com-
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When Congress enacted the Wagner Act, it adopted a social
policy permitting labor unions to exploit market power in labor
markets, with concomitant negative impacts upon production
and employment in organized industries. That policy, moreover, was adopted with awareness of its consequences. 5 6 A
union that successfully organizes all or most of the workers in
an industry is in a position to use that labor-market monopoly
to impose cartel-like restrictions on the product market, capturing monopoly returns for its members.5 7
II. LABOR POLICY AND MARKET POWER
A. THE EXTENT (AND LIMITs) OF ORGANIZED LABOR'S
LEGITIMATE POWER IN THE LABOR MARKET

1. Labor Policy as an Exception to a General
Free-Market Policy
At least since the enactment of the Sherman Act,5 8 Con-

gress has followed a policy of encouraging competition in product markets. That policy has been restated and strengthened
from time to time in various amendments to the antitrust laws
such as the Clayton Act in 1914,59 the antimerger amendment
of the Clayton Act in 1950,60 and the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act in
1976.61 Yet over the same period of time, Congress has established a policy of encouraging collective bargaining in the labor
market. It did this initially in the Railway Labor Act 62 and
merce, and tends to aggravate recurrent business depressions, by
depressing wage rates and the purchasing power of wage earners in
industry and by preventing the stabilization of competitive wage rates
and working conditions within and between industries.
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
56. See infra notes 67-76 and accompanying text.
57. See infra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
58. Ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7
(1982)).
59. Ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27
(1982)).
60. Ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 18
(1982)).
61. Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1390 (1976) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 18a (1982)).
62. Ch. 347, 44 Stat. 577 (1926) (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 151188 (1982)). The Railway Labor Act was preceded by a series of antecedents,
the first of which was the Arbitration Act of 1888, ch. 1063, 25 Stat. 501 (repealed 1898). This was followed by the Erdman Act, ch. 370, 30 Stat. 424 (1898)
(repealed 1913); the Newlands Act, ch. 6, 38 Stat. 103 (1913) (repealed 1926);
the Adamson Act, ch. 436, 39 Stat. 721 (1916) (codified at 45 U.S.C. § 65 (1982));
and the labor provisions of the Transportation Act of 1920, ch. 91, §§ 300-316,
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then later embraced this policy for the economy generally in
the National Labor Relations Act 63 and the Taft-Hartley
Amendments to that Act.6
Charged with interpreting both congressional directives,
the courts, therefore, have been required to reconcile areas of
potential conflict in those policies. Courts must, of course, exclude from the coverage of the antitrust laws the particular
kinds of labor restraints identified in sections 6 and 20 of the
Clayton Act.65 They also are called upon to exclude from the
coverage of the antitrust laws such other behavior as is necessary to facilitate the operation of the National Labor Relations
Act. 66 This reconciliation has occasionally challenged the
courts' analytical and perceptive powers and is in present need
of revision.
2.

The Assumptions Underlying Labor Policy:
An Initial Inquiry

Whether Congress in enacting the antitrust labor exemptions contained in sections 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act thought
about the effect of unionization on prices and outputs in product markets is unclear. If members of that Congress had not
anticipated industry-wide organization, they might have believed that competition among manufacturers would constrain
the power of organized labor.
Congress, in enacting the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts,
however, showed increasing awareness that it was facilitating
the exercise by unions of product-market power. The legislative history of the Wagner Act is somewhat cloudy on this issue, particularly because the Act itself carefully avoids
endorsing industry-wide bargaining units 67 under which union
41 Stat. 456 (1920) (repealed 1926). See generally W. OBERER, K. HANSLOWE, J.
ANDERSEN & T. HEINsZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAw 101-02 (3d ed.
1986) (brief history of Railway Labor Act of 1926).

63. Ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151169 (1982)).
64. Ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141187 (1982)).
65. Ch.323, §§ 6, 20, 38 Stat. 730, 731, 738 (1914) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 17,
29 U.S.C. § 52 (1982)).
66. See infra notes 93-105 and accompanying text.
67. Section 9(b) of the Act states that "the Board shall decide in each case
whether ...the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining shall
be the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof . .. ."
NLRA § 9(b), 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1982). Professors Clyde Summers, Harry
Wellington and Alan Hyde comment that "[d]espite the practical importance
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control over the labor supply would directly translate into exercises of product-market power. Professor Thomas Campbell,
focusing upon the multi-employer aspect of industry-wide bargaining, points out that such bargaining received implicit approval when Congress removed language impeding multiemployer bargaining from the bill that became the Wagner
68
Act.
Congress intended the Wagner Act, moreover, as a replacement for the substantive provisions of section 7(a) of the NIRA.
Section 7(a) not only guaranteed workers the right to organize
and bargain collectively, but also sought to impose upon all employers standard industry wages through the mechanism of industry codes 69 and the concomitant elimination of wage
competition. When Congress enacted the Wagner Act, therefore, it was familiar with the goal of industry-wide organization
and of the elimination of wage competition among employers.
Although the Wagner Act did not impose a wage structure
upon industry, Congress must have been aware that the mechanisms it was creating would result in less wage competition. In
the context not only of the NIRA but of other regulatory legislation of the time, 70 it is likely that most members of Congress
supporting the Wagner Act who considered the matter felt that
product-market restraints reflecting the unionization of industry labor were a fair price to pay for the wage increases which
71
that Act would engender.
By the time it enacted the Taft-Hartley Amendments in
1947, Congress-or at least some of its membership-appears to
have become more cognizant of the effects of industry-wide
bargaining on product markets.7 2 Although a prohibition on inof multi-employer bargaining, the Act studiously ignores it." C. SUMMERS, H.
WELLINGTON & A. HYDE, supra note 42, at 650.
68. Campbell, supra note 1, at 1056 n.295.
69. See supra text accompanying notes 43-48.
70. Congress had sought to impose a comprehensive system of cartels
upon American industry in the NIRA, and throughout the New Deal Congress
repeatedly imposed regulation which was designed to control prices and output. It is thus unlikely that Congress would have rejected labor legislation
which was otherwise satisfactory merely because it discovered that the legislation would bring about restraints in the product market.
71. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
72. The House report, commenting upon § 9 of H.R. 3020, stated:
Probably the most important clause of section 9(f) is that which
limits industry-wide bargaining and which, with sections 2(16) and
12(3)(A), dealing with monopolistic strikes, is designed to put an end
to strikes, such as we have experienced particularly in the coal and
steel industries, in which powerful and Nation-wide unions have

1988]

ANTITRUST LABOR EXEMPTION

1397

dustry-wide bargaining was not contained in the bill ultimately
enacted, 73 the House version prohibited industry-wide bargaining,74 and a proposed amendment to the Senate bill which
would have prohibited industry-wide bargaining units was defeated on the Senate floor by one vote.75 At least some of the
proponents of such a prohibition grasped the connection between the wage rate and product-market prices.7 6 By declining
to prevent industry-wide unions from exploiting product-market power despite Congress's growing institutional awareness of
that phenomenon, Congress tacitly approved or condoned that
behavior.
brought the compelling pressure of strikes to bear more upon the
Government and the public than upon the employers involved. Arrangements by which competing employers combine, voluntarily or
involuntarily, to bargain together, and arrangements by which great
national and international labor monopolies dictate the terms upon
which competing employers must operate seriously undermine our
free competitive system....

Such arrangements as these stifle competition among employers,
and slow down the development of new techniques for producing
more goods to sell at lower prices. They tend, in some cases, to reduce
the resistance of employers to extravagant demands of the unions,
and, in others, to holding down wages in plants where greater efficiency than prevails in others might, but for the group arrangements,
result in better wages for the employees. The arrangements often are
the foundation of shocking restraints of trade, such as we find in the
construction trades and in parts of the clothing industry.
... Most employers believe that the disadvantages of industrywide bargaining outweigh its advantages. Our concern, however, is
not with its advantages and disadvantages for either employers or unions. Our concern is the public interest, and the public interest demands that monopolistic practices in collective bargaining come to an
end.
H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 35-36 (1947), reprinted in NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT, 1947, at 32627 (1948) [hereinafter LIRA HISTORY].
73. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 59 (1947), reprinted
in 1947 U.S. CODE CONG. SERV. 1135, 1165 ('Trhe provisions of section 12 treating 'monopolistic strikes' as unlawful concerted activities involved the matter
of industry-wide bargaining, and this subject matter has been omitted from the
conference agreement.").
74. The House bill prohibited bargaining units larger than the employees
of a single employer "unless the employees of... [competing] employers ...
are regularly less than one hundred in number and the plants or other facilities.., are less than fifty miles apart ... ." H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 9(f) (1947), reprinted in LMRA HISTORY, supra note 72, at 187-88. It also
prohibited "monopolistic" strikes by unions representing, in separate bargaining units, employees of competing employers. Id. §§ 2(16), 12(a)(3)(A), reprintedin LMRA HISTORY, supra note 72, at 169-70, 204-05.
75. 93 CONG. REC. 4676 (1947).
76. See H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 35-36 (1947), reprintedin
LMRA HISTORY, supra note 72, at 326-27.
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The legislative histories of the Wagner and Taft-Hartley
Acts do not reveal any congressional grasp, however, of the exaggerated restraints on the product market that result from the
combination of union control over industry labor supply and
oligopolistic power in the product market by employers.7 7 The
restraint that results from this combination, therefore, calls for
a reexamination of the antitrust labor exemption.
3.

The Relation Between Labor and Antitrust Policies

The Congressional policies embodied in the labor and antitrust laws, although relatively clear, have created a conundrum
for the enforcement authorities and the courts. The difficulty
arises because Congress has adopted two different policies for
two spheres of activity; yet the two spheres are not so independent from each other that they can always be treated separately. Congress, through the enactment of the Wagner and
Taft-Hartley Acts, must be presumed to have approved the exercise of market power by labor unions in the labor market.
Conversely, Congress, in the antitrust laws, explicitly disapproved of anticompetitive restraints in product markets. The
demand for labor in any industry, however, is derived from the
demand for the product of that industry. The exercise of market power in the labor market, therefore, will have repercussions on price and output in the associated product market.
A reconciliation between labor and antitrust policies must
take account of the interrelation between labor and product
markets. To be faithful to the purposes of both labor and antitrust law, reconciliation must prevent, so far as practicable, a
union from exercising market power in the labor market that
needlessly restricts the product market: the product market
should be affected no more than necessary to give workers as a
group the full benefit of their union's exercise of its monopoly
power in the labor market.
77.

Most of those favoring a prohibition of industry-wide bargaining fo-

cused upon the inconvenience of industry-wide strikes and the concentration
of decision-making power in the leadership of national and international unions. The opponents of such a prohibition argued that industry-wide bargaining was necessary to prevent employer competition from forcing wages down.
This was, of course, an implied recognition of the product-market effects of industry-wide bargaining. There was no recognition, however, of the peculiarly
restrictive effects of bargaining between a union controlling the industry labor
supply and employers possessing oligopolistic power in the product market.
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B. MARKET POWER IN LABOR AND PRODUCT MARKETS
1.

Collective Bargaining as a Trade Restraint

Collective bargaining is a means by which workers bargain
as a unit (through a union) with their employer. In collective
bargaining, a union, controlling the labor supply for all or a
part of an employer's operation, threatens to withhold that labor supply unless the employer and the union agree on contract
terms. Protected by the antitrust laws, this kind of labormarket restraint is a premise of the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA).78 Indeed, the NLRA requires an employer to bargain with a union supported by a majority of the employer's
workers.79
The union derives bargaining power from the threat that it
will withhold labor from the employer's plant, and the employer derives bargaining power from the threat that the employer will not operate its plant and thereby deny employment
to those workers. The process does not contemplate that the
union would try to sell one employer's labor supply to a second
employer; nor does it contemplate that the employer would
look elsewhere than to the union for workers.8 0 Collective bargaining is a model of bilateral negotiation in which neither
party has recourse to substitutes provided by third parties.
2.

The Organization of Labor in a Competitively Structured
Industry

Visualize an industry composed of relatively small producers geographically separated from each other and their customers, who are also scattered geographically. Despite the
geographic separation, the producers compete vigorously with
one another.
In such an industry, a labor union representing the workers at a particular firm may obtain for its members an increased share of that firm's profits. But because the industry is
78. See §§ 1, 7, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151, 157 (1982).
79. Id. § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982).
80. The process of collective bargaining does not contemplate that the employer will seek workers who are not represented by the union. See 29 U.S.C.
§§ 158(a)(5), 159(a) (1982). The employer's hiring of permanent replacement
workers during a strike, although permitted under the Act, NLRB v. Mackay
Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345 (1938), is a situation that does not arise in
the successful practice of collective bargaining. Moreover, the Act requires the
employer to reinstate replaced strikers as vacancies appear, a practice that
replacements may perceive as engendering a threatening work environment.
See Posner, supm note 1, at 997-98.
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competitive, although imperfectly so, competition in the output
market constrains the union's achievements in the labor market. The union's attempt to increase wages is an attempt to increase the employer's labor costs. Because competition in the
output market places a ceiling upon the employer's prices, any
wage increase narrows the employer's profit margins by increasing its labor costs. Of course, some employers may have
wider room to bargain than others: some employers may be
earning higher than normal profits because they possess locational advantages over rivals (and thus incur lower transportation costs) or because they are otherwise relatively more
efficient. Regardless of their relative efficiencies, however, all
employers will reduce the quantity of goods that they offer for
sale in response to higher labor costs. Thus profits will shrink
not only because of the increased cost effect represented as a
shrinkage in profit margin, but also because of the effect of the
increased labor costs on volume: the higher labor cost will reduce the number of units that can be produced at a profit.,,
As that union organizes more and more firms, the economic pressures felt by any individual employer are eased.
When a substantial number of firms reach an identical wage
settlement with the union, the increased labor costs incurred by
each firm begin to affect the overall supply curve of the industry. Price for the industry product readjusts to a higher level,
reflecting the widely shared, higher labor costs. The firms that
had earlier experienced a squeeze on their profit margins now
experience some relief: market price has increased, lessening
the profit margin squeeze and permitting them now to profitably increase production over the reduced level to which they
8 2
had been forced by the earlier wage agreements.
With all firms in the industry organized and paying an
identical wage as a result of negotiations with the union, most
industry workers will be better off. The industry's product will
be more expensive, but the price increase will be less than the
81. Each employer that grants a wage increase will thereby increase its labor costs. The higher labor cost will be reflected in the employer's marginal
cost curve; and the marginal cost curve will intersect with the employer's marginal revenue curve (in the case of an imperfectly competitive market) or with
market price (in the case of a perfectly competitive market) at a lower level of
output than before the wage increase.
82. Note that employers holding out against union attempts to impose
wage increases upon them experience increased profits as their own labor
costs remain at the old level while the price for their product increases, due to
the lower overall industry output.
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wage increase allocable to each product.83 Total industry output will decline somewhat and some workers will lose their
jobs. If economic conditions are otherwise healthy, those displaced workers will find employment in other industries. The
industry will continue to be competitive, but competition
among producers to pay low wages will have ended.
In the scenario described, the competitive structure of the
product market acted as a constraint upon union wage demands
until the union had organized most of the industry. At that
time the union's power in the labor market eased the productmarket constraints on employers who acceded to union wage
demands. Because the union was able to control the wage costs
of most employers, it could protect employers paying union
wages from being squeezed by competition from low-wage

rivals.
After a union has organized an entire competitively structured industry, the constraints upon its power are derived primarily from the product market. Because labor cost is one
component of production cost, the demand for labor is, in effect, market demand for the product minus the cost of the
product's other components.84 More precisely, a demand for labor can be constructed by subtracting nonlabor marginal cost
from the product demand curve and then adjusting the resulting curve for changes in labor productivity that accompany
changes in output.8 5 Such a derived demand curve furnishes
83. Given the conventional assumptions that the demand for the industry
product increases as price falls (that is, that the demand curve slopes downward to the right) and that the aggregate marginal cost curve increases with
output, the price increase will be less than the wage increase allocable per unit
of output.
84. The demand for labor is the marginal revenue product of labor or the
value of what the last unit of labor produces, which in turn is equal to the
product value less the other input components. When the market is competitively structured and the union has not organized all of the industry's workers,
each firm sees product value as given by market price and hence sees the
value of the marginal product of labor determined accordingly. See, e.g., R.
EHRENBERG & R. SMITH, MODERN LABOR ECONOMIcS 59 (3d ed. 1988).
Although the value of the marginal product of labor would vary at different
market prices, no firm in a competitive market has the power to vary market
price.
When the entire labor force of an industry is organized, however, the marginal revenue product of labor is no longer given by market price, because the
union is in a position to control market price by controlling the industry wage
rate. In such circumstances the marginal product of labor is derived from the
product demand curve. See id. at 92-94.
85. This derived demand, as so constructed, is a demand for labor stated
in terms of units of labor consumed per unit of product-market output.
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the basis for the calculation by a labor union of its bargaining
strategy. If a labor union operated like a business firm attempting to maximize its profits,86 the union would attempt to
maximize the return to labor under that derived demand. In a
competitively structured product marketplace, employers possess no market power. A union controlling the industry labor
supply, however, is in a position to set industry labor costs. In
so doing, the union leverages its power in the labor market into
the product market, forcing increased prices and reduced output similar to those that would be set by a product market monopolist. The union then transforms those monopoly-like
product market revenues into wages.
3. Labor Organization in a Monopolistic or Oligopolistic
Industry
Union organization in oligopolistic or monopolistic industries produces a somewhat more complex scenario. In an industry in which a single firm is responsible for all production, that
firm sets a price-output policy based upon its own costs. Unlike a competitively structured industry which the union has
not fully organized, competition from nonunion firms possessing lower wage costs never constrains the range of bargaining
between the union and a monopolist employer. Rather, a union
begins the bargaining process in a context in which the basic
external constraint is overall demand for the industry product.
Indeed, the employer's position as a monopolist in the
product market changes the bargaining process significantly.
Because the employer has discretion in making its price-output
decisions and decides according to its own costs, the union that
bargains with the employer over wages always participates in
the employer's exercise of monopoly power in its product market. The scenario is essentially the same when a small number
of firms control the supply of an industry's product.
All other factors remaining the same, the union is always
better off when the industry that it has organized is competitively structured and the union shares no monopoly power with
the employers. A product market monopolist is a monopsonist
purchaser of industry-specific labor. Its monopsony power in
86. As pointed out in text, the analogy is imperfect because labor unions
have no analogue to a business firm's profits to maximize. As a result attempts to explain union bargaining behavior have varied. See J. DUNLOP,
supra note 1, at 28-44; D. MARTIN, AN OWNERSHIP THEORY OF THE TRADE

UNION 6-30, 47-89 (1980); A. Ross, TRADE UNION WAGE POLICY 21-44 (1948).
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the labor market offsets the union's monopoly power over
industry-specific labor.8 7 As the only industry employer, a monopolist is immune to a union's "whipsaw" tactics, that is, tactics by which the union obtains concessions from one employer
under the pressure of a strike while the employer's rivals continue to sell to their own as well as to the struck employer's
customers.
III. THE PRESENT-DAY LABOR-ANTITRUST
INTERFACE

A. IMPERFECT COMPETITION IN PRODUCT MARKETS TODAY
In the two decades following the end of World War II, it
was commonplace to describe much of American industry as
oligopolistically structured.8 8 Since that time, however, substantial parts of American industry have come under increasing
competition from foreign producers. Foreign producers, for example, presently account for over twenty percent of the United
States market for both automobiles and steel.8 9 These percentages would probably be larger in the absence of official or unofficial import restrictions. The formerly oligopolistic structure
of much of American industry appears to be rapidly evolving
into one of imperfect or monopolistic competition in which
United States producers at best must share the domestic market with foreign rivals.
This increased foreign competition for domestic sales does
not necessarily eliminate all or most price discretion by American sellers. Critics of the voluntary restraint arrangement with
Japan in the automobile industry have asserted that United
States producers reacted to the protection that the arrangement gave them by increasing their prices rather than ex87. The monopsony of the employer that possesses a product-market monopoly is a function of the organization of industry-specific labor. In the absence of that organization, the employer would hire labor from the broad
(interindustry) labor market. The employer would thus compete with employers in other industries for labor. An employer monopsony created by union
organization has no power to drive the wage level below competitive rates as

does a real monopsonist. See, e.g., P. SAMUELSON, supra note 22, at 549.
88. See, e.g., J. GALBRArrH, THE AFFLUENT Soci-rY 214-15 (1958) (describing "the typical industrial market-steel, machinery, oil, automobiles, most
nonferrous metals, chemicals" as oligopolistically structured and hence a market in which "a relatively small number of large firms enjoy, in one way or
another, a considerable discretion in setting prices").

89. See Adams & Brock, The Automobile Industry, in THE STRUCTURE OF
AMERICAN INDuSTRY 132 (W. Adams 7th ed. 1986); Adams & Mueller, The

Steel Industry, in id., at 85.
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panding their sales. 90 Similar complaints have been voiced
about the various restrictions on steel imports. 9 1 Both domestic
automobile and steel producers probably continue to retain significant power over price and thus remain industries in which
organized labor's power in the labor market requires it to participate in the employers' exercise of market power in the product markets.
In any market in which producers exercise significant market power, collective bargaining for wages under an hourlywage standard necessarily involves the union in the employers'
exercise of their market power. As long as labor thus participates in the exercise of market power wielded by employers, its
wage demands exercise an exaggerated restrictive effect upon
employers' sales in the product market and thus produce an undue negative effect upon industry employment. As this Article
will show, 92 union members as a group would be better off if
their wage demands could be transformed into profit-sharing
demands.

B.

THE STATUS OF THE ANTITRUST LABOR EXEMPTION

Over the last several decades a significant number of cases
have explored the interrelations between labor law and antitrust law.9 3 Out of this antitrust case law a nonstatutory labor
exemption has emerged. The older statutory exemption, contained in sections 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act 94 and the
Norris-LaGuardia Act,95 had eliminated strikes and certain
other types of union behavior from the scope of the antitrust
laws. The courts designed the newer, nonstatutory exemption
to ensure that the antitrust laws do not interfere with the operation of the NLRA. From the case law that engendered the
nonstatutory labor exemption, courts have developed the rule
that a labor union may lawfully exercise its power as a monopoly supplier of labor in the labor market, but it may not com90. See, e.g., Adams & Brock, supra note 89, at 159-60.
91. See Adams & Mueller, supra note 89, at 113-14.
92. See infra Parts V, VI.
93. See Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local No. 100, 421
U.S. 616 (1975); Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea
Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965) (plurality opinion); United Mine Workers of America
v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, 325
U.S. 797 (1945); see also Associated Gen. Contractors v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519 (1983).
94. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1982); 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1982).
95. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
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bine with employers to restructure a previously competitive
product market as an oligopoly or as a less competitive
96
market.
This case law developed from the Supreme Court's 1945 decision in Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3.97 In Allen
Bradley the Court condemned arrangements between a New
York City local union and electrical contractors under which
the contractors agreed to purchase all of their electrical equipment from suppliers that recognized the local as the bargaining
agent for their workers. The arrangement effectively isolated
the New York City area as a separate market for electrical
equipment. The New York City area became a captive market
for New York manufacturers who then charged monopoly
prices to their local customers and shared their monopoly profits with their unionized workers. Writing for the Court, Justice
Black condemned the arrangement on the ground that the
union was aiding local manufacturers in violating the Sherman
Act by excluding rivals from the area. 98 In Black's view the
vice of the arrangement-and that which brought it within the
scope of the Sherman Act-was the manufacturers' combination. The union's participation in that combination brought the
union itself within the scope of the Sherman Act. Black conceded that under his formulation, "the same labor union activities may or may not be in violation of the Sherman Act,
dependent upon whether the union acts alone or in combination with business groups." 99
The Supreme Court used the theme of union participation
in an employer conspiracy twenty years later in United Mine
Workers of America v. Pennington.0 0 In Pennington respondents charged the United Mine Workers with conspiring with
large coal mine operators to impose high wage rates upon less
productive, smaller operators to drive them out of business and
thereby reduce the amount of industry production. The large
employers and the union would then share the benefits of this
product market restraint. Justice White, speaking for the
Court, acknowledged that when a union controlling the industry labor supply employs that power to obtain a wage rate
agreement, the product market is restrained.1 0 ' That result,
96. Pennington, 381 U.S. at 661-69; Allen Bradley, 325 U.S. at 798, 810.
97. 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
98.

See id. at 808.

99. Id. at 810.
100. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).

101. Justice White stated:
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02
however, he defended as one contemplated by Congress.
Although a union was perfectly free to seek identical terms
from all employers and could pursue this objective through
multi-employer negotiations, it could not-consistent with the
antitrust laws-agree with one set of employers to impose a
wage scale on another group of employers. White drew a
largely formal distinction, ignoring the economic effect of the
union activity. He modeled the distinction upon Black's approach in Allen-Bradley: the union's exemption from the antitrust laws turned upon whether it was a party to an employer
conspiracy.
The Supreme Court has also permitted unions to impose,
through collective-bargaining agreements or otherwise, explicit
restrictions in the product market when those product-market
restrictions were found to be closely related to a mandatory
subject of bargaining and not part of a larger employer conspiracy. Thus, on the same day that he wrote his opinion in Pennington, Justice White wrote for a plurality in Local Union No.
189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co.,' 0 3 that a
collective-bargaining agreement limiting an employer's hours of
operation in the product market was exempt from antitrust
scrutiny.'0 4 Similarly, in other cases courts have permitted unions to control the market for dance bands 0 5 and to establish
control over theatrical agents 0 6 on the ground that their activities were necessary to10 7exert control over wages-a mandatory
subject of bargaining.
The caselaw formulation of the labor exemption, however,
is flawed because it asks a misleading question. By asking
whether the union is participating in an employer conspiracy,
the courts direct attention away from the exaggerated restraints on the product market which sometimes result from
collective-bargaining agreements themselves. The question im-

The union benefit from the wage scale agreed upon [in a multiemployer bargaining unit] is direct and concrete and the effect on the
product market, though clearly present, results from the elimination
of competition based on wages among the employers in the bargaining
unit, which is not the kind of restraint Congress intended the Sherman Act to proscribe.
Id. at 664 (citations omitted).
102. See id.
103. 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
104. Id. at 691, 697.
105. H.A. Artists & Assocs. v. Actors' Equity Ass'n, 451 U.S. 704, 713-22
(1981).
106. American Fed'n of Musicians v. Carroll, 391 U.S. 99, 102, 105-14 (1968).
107. See H.A. Artists, 451 U.S. at 713-22; Carroll,391 U.S. at 105-07.
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plicitly suggests that the wrong that a union can perform-and
that therefore denies the union an otherwise available exemption from the antitrust laws-is the creation of employer market power. As this Article shows,10 8 however, it would never be
in a union's economic interest to create market power for employers selling in a single marketplace because the demand for
labor is derived from the demand for the employers' product.
In a competitive product market, a union that has organized all
of the industry's workers can exploit its monopoly over the labor supply, constrained only by the overall demand for the industry's product. In a monopolistic or oligopolistic product
market, however, the employer's power in the product market
partially offsets the union's power. In an oligopolistic or monopolistic industry, then, the union must share its power with
the producers, while in a competitive industry the union is free
to exploit its power over the derived demand for labor without
such a constraint.
In looking for a combination with employers as the principal indicator of behavior within the cognizance of the antitrust
laws, the Supreme Court has diverted attention away from the
most substantial product-market restraints that result from
union organization. In so doing the Court has obscured the balance implicit in existing law that condemns product-market restraints unnecessary to fulfill the objectives of labor law.10 9
Rather than ask the formalistic question whether the union has
combined with employers to restrain the product market,
courts should ask whether the restraints on the product market
are greater than those that would be produced by union control
of the labor market alone. Indeed, such a question might be de-

rived from the Court's 1975 opinion in Connell Construction Co.
v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local No. 100110: are antitrust policies contravened to a degree not justified by congressional labor
108. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
109. That was Justice White's implicit ruling in Jewel Tea. See 381 U.S. at
692 (discussing whether restrictions on hours of self-service meat markets by
meatcutters union were legitimate union concern). The cases that have tolerated product-market restraints did so on the ground that those restraints were
necessary to enable the union to exercise control over the labor market. See

H.A. Artists, 451 U.S. at 719-22; Carroll,391 U.S. at 105-07.
110. 421 U.S. 616 (1975). Describing the agreement that Local 100 had entered with Connell and other general contractors, Justice Powell stated that
"[the agreement] contravenes antitrust policies to a degree not justified by

congressional labor policy, and therefore cannot claim a nonstatutory exemption from the antitrust laws." Id. at 625.
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policy? An affirmative answer to that question should remove
collective bargaining activity from the labor exemption.
In a concentrated product market, collective bargaining
agreements containing wage provisions cast in the traditional
form of fixed hourly compensation are likely to restrict excessively the product market. Because the product-market restraints in that situation are unnecessary to allow the union to
fully exploit the labor market, the antitrust laws should require that bargaining take a less restrictive direction. The objective, in short, should be to tolerate union exploitation of its
control over the labor market without exacerbating the restrictive effects of a preexisting employer oligopoly in the product
market.
Nothing in the history of the Wagner Act indicates that
Congress contemplated more than the encouragement of union
organization and the creation of a set of conditions under which
unions could exploit economic power over the labor market.
Congress never addressed the possibility that the combination
of union power over labor and employer product-market power
would doubly restrain the product market. This peculiar combination of powers acutely raises an apparent policy conflict between the antitrust and labor laws. Yet this policy conflict is
only apparent because the principles embodied in existing law
provide the means for achieving the goals of both antitrust and
labor law. A redefinition of the labor exemption from antitrust
law would have the salutary effect of freeing product markets
from this potential double restraint while preserving organized
labor's ability to exploit fully its power in the labor market.
C.

ANTITRUST LAWS AND THE EXERCISE OF
OLIGOPOLISTIC POWER

Although competitive markets are objectives of the antitrust laws, and although the Sherman Act condemns unreasonable restraints brought about through concerted action, the
courts have been unable effectively to undo the effects of oligopolistic behavior.
Since World War II, courts and the enforcement authorities have wrestled with the application of the antitrust laws tc
oligopolistic behavior. In American Tobacco Co. v. United
States,"' the Supreme Court upheld a conviction of the majoi
tobacco companies and some of their officials for conspiracy t(
111.

328 U.S. 781 (1946).
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violate sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.112 That conspiracy
consisted, in part, of the companies following (up or down) the
pricing decisions of a leader.11 3 That behavior, however,
amounted only to the companies consciously recognizing the interdependence of their pricing decisions. 1 4 Indeed, it was only
because of the criminal nature of the proceeding 115 that the
Court's decision was not immediately exposed as an unworkable interpretation of the antitrust laws. Had the proceeding
been a civil enforcement action, the trial court would have been
required to issue an injunction rather than impose a penalty;
and it would have been apparent that an injunction prohibiting
parallel pricing in an oligopoly setting could not be written.
The untenable nature of American Tobacco's condemnation of
parallel pricing is now widely recognized.
In the 1970s the Federal Trade Commission, through a
newly developed doctrine of "shared monopoly," 1 6 undertook
another assault upon oligopoly pricing. Although it brought
also
assault was
the Commission's
cases,
several
117
unsuccessful.
In practice the antitrust laws counter oligopoly either by
preventing it in the first place through merger prohibitions or
by shielding independent pricing decisions from the scrutiny of
rivals. Section 7 of the Clayton Act proscribes mergers and acquisitions that threaten to transform competitive market structures into oligopolistic ones. The Department of Justice
Merger Guidelines employ market concentration indices to
carry out the objectives of section 7.
The antitrust laws also mitigate the anticompetitive effects
of an oligopolistic market structure by limiting the communication of firm-specific pricing information from one oligopolist to
another. Thus, in a number of cases, the Supreme Court has
sought to protect the kind of secret price negotiation that erodes oligopolistic and other noncompetitive pricing structures.
112. Id. at 814-15.
113. See id. at 801-02.
114. See id. at 800-04.
115. See id. at 783.
116. The concept was articulated in 1978 by John H. Shenfield, Assistant
Attorney General, Antitrust Division. See Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rptr.
(BNA) No. 874, at F-1 to F-6 (1978). Shared monopolies involve parallel practices in a highly concentrated industry which facilitate the coordination of
prices or production or cause the exclusion of new competitors. Id. at F-1.
117. See Ethyl Corp., 101 F.T.C. 425 (1983), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1984); Kellogg Co., 99 F.T.C. 8 (1982) (dismissed as brought under inappropriate theory).
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8
In Sugar Institute v. United States,"1
for example, the Court
modified and approved an antitrust decree that helped to shield
sellers' secret price negotiations from the scrutiny of rivals." 9
The Court, in United States v. Container Corp. of America, 2 0
condemned a practice of mutual price verification in an industry whose characteristics betrayed noncompetitive pricing. 12
Following that same approach, in United States v. United States
Gypsum Co.,122 Chief Justice Burger's opinion for the Court explicitly recognized the value of secret price negotiations in
3
breaking down oligopolistic restraints.2
In short, the antitrust laws have sought to mitigate the effects of oligopoly whenever possible. This Article shows that
union control of industry labor supply tends to exacerbate the
restrictive effects of oligopolistic price-output decisions. Union
control over the labor supply in an oligopolistically structured
industry, therefore, should become a matter of antitrust cognizance; and the effects of the combined employer-union power
should be weighed in the process of redefining the parameters
of the labor exemption.

IV.

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND UNION
ORGANIZATION

In industries that have been successfully organized, a labor
union acts like a monopoly supplier of a needed input into the
manufacturing process. Although the union cannot effectively
divert the supply of labor it controls from one employer to another or to employers outside the industry, the employers cannot obtain labor except on the terms to which they and the
union have agreed. The result is almost certainly a higher
wage rate than would otherwise occur. This higher wage rate
necessarily means that fewer jobs will be available in the unionized industry 124 and that some workers who might otherwise
have found employment in that industry will be shut out.
When Congress enacted the Wagner Act, it did not focus
upon that aspect of the collective bargaining process that trades
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

297
See
393
See
438
See

U.S. 553 (1936).
id. at 602-05.
U.S. 333 (1969).
id. at 334-35.
U.S. 422 (1978).
id. at 456-58.

124. See, e.g., C. MULVEY, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF TRADE UNIONS 13435 (1978); see also R. EHRENBERG & R. SMITH, MODERN LABOR ECONOMICS 39094 (3d ed. 1988); P. SAMUELSON, supra note 22, at 550.
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employment for higher wages. Indeed, Congress appears to
have acted under an opposite premise: many members of Congress believed higher wages, produced under a regime of collective bargaining, would create purchasing power that would in
turn engender an expansion of existing employment.
Moreover, Congress gave absolutely no thought to the
question of how the structure of labor unions themselves might
affect the policies that the unions pursued. Thus no basis exists
for believing that Congress has ever tacitly approved the way in
which certain structural features of union organization foster
the pursuit of the trade-off between jobs and higher wages to
extreme, socially detrimental lengths. Developed below is an
analysis of union decision-making incentives revealing, not only
how internal conflicts within the union are likely to work
counterproductively, but also how the resolution of those conflicts adversely affects unorganized workers, racial minorities,
workers from other disadvantaged groups, and the general
public.

A.

LABOR UNION DECISION MAKING AND UNION BARGAINING
STRATEGY

1.

A Parable

Assume that one union has organized an entire industry
and that union organization is democratic in the extreme: a
majority vote of the entire membership makes union policy
town-meeting style. Assume further that when layoffs occur,
they affect workers in reverse order of seniority: those workers employed for the shortest period are the first to be laid off
and those employed for the longest period are the last. Finally,
assume that laid-off union members who remain unemployed
for longer than one year find employment outside the industry
and drop their union membership. Collective bargaining contracts are entered for two-year periods.
The union must decide upon a wage policy to pursue in negotiations for the next two-year collective bargaining contract.
Because any wage increase will diminish the employers' profits,
employers will to some extent resist any union attempt to increase wages. Despite the employers' resistance, the union
must itself decide whether to seek a substantial wage increase,
a moderate one, or no wage increase at all.
Because any general wage increase will be immediately reflected in the industry prices and output, the union faces an evident trade-off between the wage rate and the number of
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persons employed in the industry. The union's decision-making
process thus differs significantly from the decision-making process of a typical supplier that seeks to maximize its profits from
selling inputs to an output producer. The latter has a simple
goal-maximize profits-but for a union the maximization of
worker welfare is ambiguous. Is worker welfare measured
solely by the level of wages, the number of workers employed,
or by some combination of the two?
In the simplified situation of this parable, the union's
decision-making structure provides the answer. Those workers
with the longest seniority will be the last to leave when reduced output requires some workers to be laid off. Workers
with the greatest seniority, therefore, will have the least to fear
from layoffs and the most to gain from wage increases. Conversely, workers with the least seniority will be laid off first
and will lose as a result of any wage increase that causes
worker layoffs.
Because the union's decisions are made democratically, the
union will decide to seek a wage increase that will not threaten
the continued employment of the majority of its members with
greatest seniority. More precisely, the members will approve,
by a majority vote, a policy that seeks the maximum wage increase that will not produce layoffs for a majority. The union
will strive to obtain the highest wage rate consistent with the
continued employment of just over fifty percent of its
membership.
Two years later the union will again decide upon the wage
policy it will pursue in negotiations for the next collective bargaining contract. The earlier contract produced a wage rate
close to that desired by the union majority, resulting in a lay off
of a large minority of union members. Those workers laid off
have not worked in the industry for close to two years and have
now dropped out of the union. Employment in the industry is
slightly more than half the employment of two years earlier;
and the union membership is now slightly more than half its
membership of two years earlier. Accordingly, this smaller
number of employed union members will vote on the union's
new bargaining policy.
The reduced union membership will adopt, by majority
vote, a bargaining goal of the maximum wage consistent with
the continued employment of a majority. To the extent that
the union successfully imposes its policy on employers, the in-
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dustry wage rate will rise, industry production will decline, and
industry employment will be reduced.
This scenario will repeat itself at two-year intervals. At
each repetition, the industry wage rate will increase, and employment will fall by slightly less than fifty percent. In theory,
the spiral of rising wages, falling output, and falling employment continues indefinitely.
2.

Reflections on the Parable

The parable above simplifies reality with various assumptions: unions bargain collectively with employers in recurring
two-year sequences; labor unions use town-meeting style democracy to adopt bargaining goals; union members vote their
individual economic interest; members cease to participate in
union affairs one year after being laid off; and productivity and
overall demand remain entirely unchanged. Moreover, carried
relentlessly to its conclusion, the logic of the parable indicates
that employment and output would approach zero after several
rounds of contract negotiation, a result that is inconsistent with
experience. The fact that unions in reality do not pursue such
extreme strategies shows that offsetting factors are at work:
some unions are not as democratic as the parable assumes;
workers are not unaffected by the interests of their colleagues;
and institutional factors within the union-especially the efforts of union managers-operate to blur the membership's perceptions of their individual interests. Indeed, union managers
may have incentives of their own, which conflict with the interests of the majority: to maintain large membership rolls to enhance their own power and prestige as leaders of a large
organization and maintain or increase union revenues from
dues-paying members.
Despite its simplifications, however, the parable draws attention to two significant factors affecting the bargaining process: the trade-off between wage increases and employment
reduction and the way in which the union's decision-making
process may affect its bargaining goals. The first factor is
analogous to other trade-offs affecting economic relations, such
as the trade-off between prices charged and quantities
purchased. The second factor involves the union reaction to the
wage-employment trade-off. These factors will be examined
below.
The parable shows that the incentive for unions progressively to trade employment for higher wages exists regardless
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of the degree of competition in the product market (or lack
thereof). Generally, union negotiators would experience pressure to seek a return skewed toward the interests of the most
senior workers.12 5 Maximizing labor's overall return would be
inconsistent with maximizing the return to the most senior
workers.
B. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
VERTICAL RESTRAINTS

1.

Vertical Supply Contracts in General

Economists have analyzed the determinants of contracts
between input suppliers and business firms that purchase those
inputs for use in production or for resale. 12 6 Because a labor
union controls the labor supply available to an employer for
use in production, the union acts as a monopoly input supplier.
The part of economic analysis that most clearly bears on the
determinants of collective bargaining, therefore, is concerned
125. In only one restricted market setting would these incentives exert
pressure on union negotiators to seek to maximize the overall return to labor.
In a situation of a linear product demand and constant marginal costs (includ-

ing labor costs), a wage rate which would maximize the return of a majority of
the most senior workers would coincide with the maximum return available to
labor in the aggregate.
126. See, e.g., R. ALLEN, MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS FOR ECONOMISTS 381
(1938); R. BLAIR & D. KASERMAN, LAW AND ECONOMICS OF VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND CONTROL (1983); E. SINGER, ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 209-11 (1968);
F. WARREN-BOULTON, supra note 1; see also D. GIFFORD & L. RASKIND, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAw 150-53 (1983); Friedman, Anti-

trust Analysis and BilateralMonopoly, 1986 Wis. L. REV. 873, 878-83; Greenhut & Ohta, Related Market Conditions and InterindustrialMergers, 66 AM.
ECON. REv. 267, 275-76 (1976); Greenhut & Ohta, Related Market Conditions
and InterindustrialMergers: A Reply, 68 AM. ECON. REV. 228, 229-30 (1978);
Haring & Kaserman, Related Market Conditions and InterindustrialMergers:
Comment, 68 AM. ECON. REV. 225, 225-27 (1978); Machlup & Taber, Bilateral

Monopoly, Successive Monopoly, and Vertical Integration,27 ECONOMICA 101,
110-13 (1960); Markovits, Tie-ins, Reciprocity, and the Leverage Theory, 76
YALE L.J. 1397, 1401-02 (1967).
This standard analysis is generally subdivided into analyses of the case in
which the output producer must use a monopolized input in constant proportions with other inputs and of the case in which the output producer may use a
monopolized input with variable proportions of other inputs. In the latter
case, the monopolist input supplier would attempt to preclude the output producer from substituting other inputs for the monopolized one. One way to
avoid those substitution effects is through various forms of vertical integration.
See, e.g., R. BLAIR & D. KASERMAN, supra, at 28-82. Although producers may,

to significant degrees, substitute capital for labor, the analysis in this Article
does not direct itself to the substitution effects on employer production
processes engendered by union control over the labor supply.
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xith the relation between a monopoly input supplier and its
customers.
Input suppliers' positions worsen as their customers gain
market power, whether or not the input industry is competitively or monopolistically structured. When the input industry
is selling to distributors possessing monopolies over their areas
of distribution, the distributors tend to restrict sales to exploit
their local monopolies. Their restricted sales reduce the quantities they purchase and the prices they pay to input suppliers
from the quantities and price levels that would have prevailed
if the distributors operated in a competitively structured
market.
Even when the input industry is itself a monopoly or an oligopoly, the input industry will be worse off when their customers also possess market power. When the customers of
oligopolistic or monopolistic input suppliers possess market
power, the monopolists or oligopolists controlling the input industry are forced to share their own market power with their
customers. Indeed, when the customers exercise market power
in the output market, the resulting restraint in the output market is reflected in a reduced demand for the input, because the
demand for the input is derived from the demand for the
output.
If the customer exercises unrestrained monopoly power in
the output market, then derived demand for the input is restrained to the maximum extent, and the input producer's exercise of its own monopoly control over input supply results in
a doubly restrictive impact. The restrictive actions of the input
supplier become the base from which the output seller adds its
own restrictions. The restrictive actions of both firms inflate
the price of the output. As a result prices for the output are
higher and quantities of the output are smaller than they
would be if only one market was monopolized. Moreover, the
combined monopoly profits of the input and output sellers are
less than the profits that would be earned by an integrated
input-output seller.
Because its customers' market power in the output market
constrains the profit-making capabilities of an input producer
with market power in the input market, input producers sometimes try to place a ceiling on the prices of the output producer.
Ideally, they place the ceiling at the level at which the output
producer would sell if it purchased from a monopolist supplier
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(which it does) and sold in a competitive market.1 7 The final
price should be at the level at which the output producer's marginal cost curve intersects with the product's demand curve.
The input producer may have insufficient bargaining power
vis-a-vis the output producer to impose a ceiling upon the latter's prices. Nonetheless, the two firms have an incentive to
reach an agreement under which prices for the output product
would equal those set by an output producer purchasing from a
monopolist supplier but reselling in a competitive market.
They would reach that arrangement either by integrating their
operations into one firm or by setting the prices of the output
product through contract and dividing the profits of the combined operation in such a way that each company's profits
increased.
Whether the two firms integrate vertically into a single enterprise or replicate the operations of a merged enterprise
through a contractual arrangement, the aggregate profits of the
input supplier and the output producer will be greater than the
aggregate profits of the two firms acting separately. When acting individually, each follows its limited instincts by attempting
to sell at a monopoly price calculated according to its own separate operations. When acting in combination, however, the
firms increase the total output, sell the end product at lower
prices, and earn higher total profits.
2.

Vertical Contract Analysis as Applied to Unions as
Monopoly Suppliers of Labor

Under the standard analysis of vertical agreements, a monopoly input supplier's economic interest is furthered when the
output producer replicates the behavior of a firm in a competitive market. When the output firm expands production until
its marginal cost equals market price and in the process earns
only a normal, competitive return, the return to the input supplier is maximized. Considering labor as an input and a labor
union as a monopoly supplier of that input, this analysis suggests that the union's interest is furthered when the output
producer (the employer) operates at price and output levels
that replicate those of a firm selling in a competitive market. 128
127. See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 152-53 (1968); see also D. GIF& L. RAsKIND, supra note 126, at 150-53 (discussing Albrecht in light of
bilateral monopoly theory).
128. The standard analysis of vertical contracts indicates that a monopoly
output producer's economic interest is furthered when its input supplier repliFORD
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This analysis, which applies to monopoly input suppliers,
however, cannot be directly applied to labor unions because it is
predicated upon the assumption that the input supplier strives
to maximize its profits, and the goal of the labor union is more
ambiguous.
V.

MAXIMIZING LABOR'S RETURN

A. MAXIMIZING THE AGGREGATE RETURN TO LABOR
According to the analysis of vertical relationships, workers
considered as a group maximize their return when the union,
and not the employer, exercises monopoly power. The collective bargaining contract can maximize the aggregate return to
labor only when the employer does not independently attempt
to exercise market power. For several reasons, however, labor
unions might not follow a strategy that maximizes the aggregate return to workers. It is not clear how labor unions trade
off the prospect of wage increases against prospective reductions in industry employment or how the internal decisionmaking processes of labor unions work. It is clear, however,
that because of the effects of seniority, the economic incentives
of the majority of workers rarely coincide with the maximization of the overall return to labor. Finally, it is uncertain what
time horizons prevail when labor decision making must balance
workers' short-run interests against their longer term ones.
To maximize the aggregate return to labor, unions, in bargaining with employers in oligopolistically or monopolistically
structured industries, must discourage or prevent those employcates the behavior of a firm in a competitive market. When the input firm
sells at a price which equals its marginal cost (and in the process earns only a
normal competitive return), the monopoly output producer will be able to
maximize its monopoly profits. Indeed, holding other factors constant, the total profits available to the input supplier and the output producer are exactly
the same, whether the input producer replicates competitive behavior and the
output producer behaves like a monopolist or whether the input producer
behaves like a monopolist and the output producer replicates competitive behavior or whether the two firms integrate together to form a single integrated
monopoly.
The standard analysis of vertical contracts, therefore, suggests that the
economic interest of any employer-whether or not it possesses market
power-would lie in minimizing labor costs. It also suggests that the economic
interest of any labor union considered as a monopoly supplier of labor would
encourage it to force the employer whose workers it represents to sell at
prices that are equal to its marginal cost. The relationship between a labor
union controlling the industry labor supply and an employer controlling industry production is described graphically in the appendix.
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ers from exercising market power in their product market.
Collective bargaining negotiators could properly ignore employers' price and output decisions in competitively structured product markets because competitive pressures effectively
discourage restrictive behavior by employers. In industries in
which employers possess market power, however, bargaining
contracts should contain constraints on employers' power because the exercise of market power in product markets reduces
the residual power available to labor and thereby diminishes labor's potential aggregate return.
In theory, several options are open to a labor union that
seeks to maximize the aggregate return to labor in its negotiations with an employer possessing market power. Most advantageous economically to the union would be the inclusion of a
provision in the collective bargaining agreement that required
the employer to price its goods at their marginal cost. 2 9 Such a
provision would put the union in a position analogous to that of
a monopoly input supplier who sets a ceiling on the resale
prices of a monopoly output producer.
Just as a monopoly input supplier may lack the bargaining
power to compel a monopoly output producer (its customer) to
observe a price ceiling and thereby to surrender any share in
monopoly profits, the union may lack the bargaining power to
compel an employer possessing market power to surrender the
entire benefit of its market power to the union. In the case of
the input and output product monopolies, however, economically rational conduct by the parties will lead them to a solution in which the return to each is increased, even though
neither party possesses the bargaining power to force the other
to forego all monopoly benefits. When neither the input supplier nor the output producer has the power to compel the
other to turn over all the monopoly benefits, the parties can
nonetheless optimize their positions by integrating into one enterprise and sharing the ownership (and profits) of that single
integrated enterprise. Because the profits of the integrated enterprise will exceed the combined profits of each firm acting
naively as an individual monopolist, the firms, acting as an inte129.

Such an agreement involving, as it would the employer's behavior in

its product market, would lie beyond the normal range of bargaining. See Local No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 692-97
(1965). Under current conceptions of antitrust, such an agreement might be
viewed as vertical price fixing and as illegal per se under Dr. Miles Medical
Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 408 (1911), and Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 152-53 (1968).
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grated enterprise, will face a range of possible profit allocations
that would improve each of their positions over its preintegration status.
A labor union that lacks power to force an employer with
market power to surrender all its market power to the union
may nonetheless be able to strike a bargain with the employer
analogous to the integrated relationship of an input supplier
and an output producer. A collective bargaining contract allocating to labor a percentage of the employer's return over its
nonlabor variable costs would represent such a bargain.

B. PROFIT SHARING IN CoLLECrrVE BARGAINING
ARRANGEMENTS

When a union and an employer possessing market power
incorporate a profit-sharing provision into a collective bargaining agreement as a substitute for an hourly wage increase or as
a trade-off for an hourly wage reduction, they change the constraints affecting the employer's market behavior. To the extent that labor's remuneration is in the form of profit sharing,
the employer's economic interest is furthered by maximizing
the difference between total revenues and total nonlabor variable costs, because it is that aggregate from which the employer's operating profit, as well as the return to labor, is
determined. Profit-sharing clauses thus pro tanto provide employers in oligopolistically structured industries with incentives
to operate their businesses in ways that maximize labor's (as
well as the employers') returns. Such clauses would, in short,
reduce the restrictive incentives otherwise affecting these industries. In theory, employers' profits, aggregate wages, output,
and employment would increase, while prices would fall.
1.

The Impact of the Seniority System on Profit-Sharing
Arrangements

Despite their potential for maximizing labor's return, most
profit-sharing agreements are not in the interest of the most senior workers. A wage agreement that maximizes the wages of
a majority of the most senior workers will always provide each
of those workers individually with more compensation than
will any profit-sharing plan. Profit sharing as an alternative to
higher wages, therefore, conflicts with the economic interests
of the union majority composed of the most senior workers.
Whether or not a union is receptive to profit sharing as a
compensation arrangement depends upon whether it is most re-
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sponsive to the economic interests of the most senior workers,
rather than to the interests of workers as an aggregate regardless of their seniority. Normal organizational influences tend to
make unions more responsive to the majority composed of their
most senior members.
2.

Explaining the Absence or Presence of Profit-Sharing
Clauses

a.

Union Policymaking and the Relative Rarity of ProfitSharing Agreements

Despite the fact that, in oligopolistic industries, the use of
profit sharing would increase the return to both employers and
labor, profit-sharing provisions have not played a significant
part in collective bargaining contracts until recently. The most
obvious explanation for the absence of these clauses is that one
of the parties does not want them. Profit-sharing clauseswhile potentially maximizing the overall return to labor-are,
as an alternative to any practicable form of hourly wage compensation, disadvantageous to the majority of workers with the
greatest seniority.
The hourly wage protects the fortunes of the workers with
the greatest seniority from short-run misfortune by casting the
burden of short-run economic adjustments upon those workers
with the least seniority. Paying a contractually fixed hourly
wage, an employer that experiences a shrinking demand for its
product cannot react by lowering its wage rate. Rather, it can
adjust only by restricting output and laying off workers. The
full impact of the hourly wage thus can be understood only in
the context of the seniority system.
Not only does the fixed hourly wage, together with the
seniority system, provide almost guaranteed lifetime employment to a firm's most senior workers, but it also provides them
with continuous increases in monetary benefits. 30 Collective
bargaining agreements periodically adjust the fixed hourly
wage upwards in periods of prosperity, but rarely adjust it
downwards. Because the present system of collective bargaining casts the burden of adverse economic conditions entirely on
the workers with the least seniority, the combination of a fixed
130. Although the seniority system provides the most senior workers with
job security and continuously increasing monetary benefits, their real benefits
may or may not increase over time, depending upon government economic policies. In particular, real wages may fall although monetary wages are increasing if the increase in money wages is less than the inflation rate.
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hourly wage and the seniority system provides almost guaranteed lifetime employment with periodically increasing money
wages to a core of workers with the greatest seniority.
For these reasons compensation in the form of profit sharing is less advantageous to the workers with the most seniority
than is compensation in the form of hourly wages. To the extent that union bargaining positions reflect the interests of
their most senior members, therefore, unions oppose profitsharing provisions.
b.

The Complex Process of Union Policy Formulation

Unions, however, do not appear simply to reflect the unmodified economic interests of their most senior members.
They almost never force employers to engage in large-scale layoffs to provide substantially increased wages to the bare majority who remain employed. Instead, union practices show that
they respond to the needs of more than a bare majority of their
membership. Indeed, in moderating their wage demands sufficiently to avoid large layoffs, unions sacrifice the interests of
the most senior workers to the interests of substantial numbers
of less senior workers.
How unions formulate bargaining strategy is a question of
major importance. In addition to the economic interests of the
union members and the seniority system, other influences are
at work. As instrumentalities for collective action by workers,
unions depend partially upon an ideology of worker solidarity.
This ideology could significantly dampen the influence of the
economic interests of the most senior workers upon the union
officials who formulate strategy. Such an ideological influence
would be likely to reduce the impact of the members' individual economic interests without eliminating that impact entirely.
Under such a hypothesis, the uni6n would strive for a result
that subordinates the interests of the most senior members to a
goal of benefiting more than a bare majority of its members.
Finally organizational factors, such as the incentives of union
officials to broaden the membership base, also work to
subordinate the purely economic interests of the most senior
majority. This Article does not attempt to explain exactly how
the union determines strategy but accepts the premise that the
union decision makers are, in significant degree, responsive to
the union's most senior members. Competing influences, such
as ideology and organizatinal factors, however, may moderate
this responsiveness.
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Under the premise that unions are institutionally structured to reflect primarily the interests of their most senior
members (moderated by other influences), the absence of
profit-sharing agreements is readily explainable. The most senior workers naturally prefer to allocate the burden of economic downturns to their less senior colleagues. They also are
understandably uninterested in any additional revenue that
their firm might earn from expanded production and employment unless they benefit from that increased revenue. Because
these most senior workers do not need the job security that
profit sharing affords their less senior colleagues, and because
they are unlikely to profit from the increased enterprise revenues that profit sharing facilitates, this core of senior workers
has nothing to gain from profit-sharing agreements. By contrast, profit sharing would take away from them the benefit of
the alternative hourly wage bargain and distribute that benefit
over a wider class of workers.
c.

Explaining the Existence of Profit Sharing

Some profit-sharing agreements, nevertheless, exist today
for two reasons. When industry demand declines so rapidly
that significant numbers of the most senior workers perceive
their jobs threatened, a new majority emerges for whom job security is the predominant concern. Profit sharing then becomes
attractive to union negotiators, who respond to this new
majority.
Employers in oligopolistic (or monopolistic) markets also
prefer profit sharing. When employers possess bargaining
power sufficiently superior to their unions, they may impose
profit-sharing arrangements upon their workers in lieu of
hourly wage adjustments. Profit-sharing arrangements in unorganized firms such as Eastman Kodak, for example, fit that
explanation. In some industries, like the automobile industry,
the options to contract out work or to relocate production facilities abroad may enhance the employers' position, giving them
the bargaining power to obtain union consent to the transformation of some hourly wage compensation into profit sharing.
Moreover, in circumstances of declining demand, the employer
interest in profit sharing coincides with the interests of the
above described, newly emerging union majorities.
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VI. THE IMPACT OF THE PREVAILING FORM OF
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ON UNITED
STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE
A.

HOURLY-WAGE BARGAINING

Under the system of wage determination prevailing in
the United States, bargaining about wages takes place on an
industry-by-industry basis. Generally, one union represents all
workers in an industry. An industry's profit-making ability is
usually taken as an indication of its ability to increase wages.
The reverse, however, is generally not true. Industry losses or
other economic reverses do not often result in wage reductions.
Those losses or other reverses result in layoffs. Accordingly, almost all industries experience rachet-like growth in wage rates
over time. Good years produce wage increases, and bad years
produce layoffs-but no wage reductions. When good years
thereafter follow, employers rehire workers previously laid off
during the downturn in business and increase wages from a
base that was set during the last period of prosperity.
This process results in wage rates that continuously rise in
all industries and wage rates that rise highest in the most profitable industries. Profitability may result from market power
or efficiency. In an industry in which profitability arises from
both sources, the tendencies described in this Article combine
to produce perverse results.
As firms increase their efficiency, their profits increase. As
their profits increase, they become, pro tanto, candidates for
wage increases. Other factors aside, the more efficient industries thus are likely to become those that over time will pay
higher wages than less efficient industries. Furthermore, because firms rarely reduce money wages, industries that at one
time were highly efficient become saddled with a differentially
high wage structure that remains in place even after they lose
their efficiency lead.
B.

WAGE COSTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE

The free-trade goals pursued by the United States since its
entry into GATT in the immediate post-World War II period
are based upon the premise that the entire world, including the
United States, will be enriched when world resources are allocated in ways that best serve consumer wants. These goals are
based upon a belief in the theory of comparative advantage in
international trade: that when each nation specializes in pro-
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ducing those products and services that it can produce at the
131
lowest cost, the allocation of world resources is optimized.
The industry-level bargaining practice followed in the United
States erodes the comparative advantages (or exacerbates the
comparative disadvantages) of the most successful United
States industries.
The general wage level prevailing in a nation, under accepted international trade theory, can confer no comparative
advantage or disadvantage upon that nation's producers in their
competition for sales with foreign rivals. The general wage
level, albeit low or high, confers no advantage or disadvantage
on producers selling in foreign markets because the currency
market in theory offsets the effects of the general wage level.
The market for the nation's currency reflects any factor common to a nation's entire economy. A doubling of prices in the
United Kingdom, for example, would not make English goods
more expensive to an American buyer because the value of the
pound in the currency market would fall to reflect such a doubling of prices in the United Kingdom. An American purchaser
would pay the same amount of dollars to purchase twice the
number of pounds and could use those pounds to purchase the
same quality and quantity of English goods as he or she was
able to purchase before the price rise.
In international trade the differential wage confers the
wage cost advantage or disadvantage. An industry that pays its
workers substantially more than the wage prevailing through
all domestic industries incurs a wage cost disadvantage in comnot
parison to its rivals in other nations whose wage costs do
13 2
vary so much from the norms prevailing in those nations.
The practice in the United States of negotiating hourly
wage based compensation through industry-by-industry collective bargaining periodically transforms production efficiencies
into wage costs. In so doing it perversely erodes or destroys
comparative advantages initially possessed by United States
firms in international trade. The process is simple: those advantages produce profits, and bargaining transforms those profits into wage costs raising differentially the costs of these most
efficient industries. As a result the profitability of these firms
that might otherwise have been shared with their employees is
reduced or destroyed.
131. On the theory of comparative advantage, see P. SAMUELSON, supra
note 22, at 626-50.
132. See, e.g., M. KREININ, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 242-44 (5th ed. 1987).
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The seniority system, however, impedes the incentive of labor unions to change the focus of their negotiations to preserve
or foster the comparative efficiencies of United States firms:
the seniority system tends to make union negotiators responsive primarily to a core of long-term union members whose fortunes are substantially insulated from the fortunes of their
employer and other workers.
If a United States industry that previously held a comparative advantage loses that advantage and retrenches, employment in that industry will fall, but the workers who are laid off
will not necessarily be unemployed. If the domestic economy is
operating at a full-employment level, 133 those workers will find
employment in another industry. This second industry, providing substitute employment to the laid-off workers, may or may
not produce goods for sale in competition with goods produced
abroad (traded goods). 134 If it does produce traded goods and
possesses a comparative advantage in their production and sale,
ultimately it too will lose that comparative advantage as the
scenario that eroded the comparative advantage of the first industry repeats itself. When this second industry loses its comparative advantage, it will also lay off workers who will be
forced to seek substitute employment. This cycle tends to route
workers away from traded goods industries into industries that
do not compete with foreign producers.
Traded goods industries are among .the most productive in
terms of value added by each worker to their raw material inputs. When the collective bargaining scenario routes workers
away from traded goods into nontraded goods industries, it
often shifts workers from high (or potentially high) wage to
low wage industries. Moreover, traded goods industries are
often mass-production industries that have the potential of providing high wage employment to large numbers of relatively
uneducated workers. The scenario, therefore, reduces the
United States economy's ability to meet the needs of its least
fortunate members.
C.

THE RELEVANCE OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE TO THE EROSION
OF THE MARKET POSITIONS OF UNITED STATES FIRMS

The phenomenon described here does not depend upon in133. The common expositions of the theory of comparative advantage assume universal full employment.
134.

For a definition of traded goods, see A. KRUEGER, EXCHANGE-RATE

DETERMINATION 27 & n.17 (1983).
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dustry structure. Domestic producers lacking market power,

and those retaining market power 135 are equally vulnerable 13to6
this progressive erosion of their comparative cost positions.
As industry cost positions erode away, increasingly uncompetitive prices and diminishing profits reflect the industries' growing cost disadvantages.
Because the transformation of employer profits into hourly
wages can erode the comparative advantages of domestic industries, a change in collective bargaining demands in favor of
profit sharing would help to preserve the comparative advantages of these industries in international trade. The transformation of collective bargaining in domestic industries in which
producers lack market power, however, raises a number of difficult problems. If unions in competitively structured industries were compelled to bargain for percentages of employer
profits, rather than hourly wage rates, a union's control over
the supply of industry-specific labor would be neutralized. A
union's right to bargain for hourly wages enables it to impose
identical wage costs upon all domestic producers. In so doing
the union acts as a coordinating mechanism through which the
industry charges monopoly prices to the public and routes the
revenue generated to the industry's workers. The union's behavior in this circumstance exactly parallels the actions of a
patentee, channelling monopoly profits to itself by setting the
135.

In many industries domestic firms compete with foreign producers for

sales either in the United States or abroad. In a significant number of such
industries, a small number of United States producers supply a large portion
of the domestic market. In these circumstances the United States producers
are likely both to possess significant market power in the domestic market and
yet to be subject to substantial competition from foreign rivals. That situation
prevails, for example, in the automobile and steel industries.
136. In industries in which domestic producers possess market power,
prices can be expected to reflect that power. The insistence of domestic producers on exploiting their remaining power in an eroding market position is, of
course, not helpful to their long-run market position vis-a-vis their foreign rivals. It would be a mistake, however, to ignore the impact of the hourly wage
rate by attributing the eroding competitive position of those industries solely
to the producers' exploitation of their remaining power in the domestic market. All of the parties-the producers as well as their workers-are economic
actors. The short-run profit maximization of producers possessing market
power requires them to set their price-output policy in relation to their marginal production costs. Increased labor costs, are therefore necessarily reflected
in higher prices and reduced output. Similarly, in competitively structured industries, as profits are transformed into higher wage costs, domestic producers
become progressively burdened with differentially higher costs than their foreign competitors, thus directly eroding their competitive position and compelling them to reduce production and employment.
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royalties of its licensees at levels that produce monopoly prices
in the licensees' selling market. 37 A general requirement that
unions bargain in terms of profit sharing about compensation
that is over a specified amount, therefore, would conflict with
national labor policy. A requirement that unions in industries
facing foreign competition bargain in terms of profit sharing
would also have to address apparent conflicts between trade
policy and the national policy allowing unions to exploit fully
whatever power they can muster in the labor market.
In those industries in which domestic producers possess significant market power, however, unions and employers can significantly reduce the progressive erosion of their competitive
position vis-A-vis foreign producers. A requirement that, above
a specified compensation level, collective bargaining negotiations employ profit sharing rather than hourly wage measures
of compensation would remove wages from employers' calculations of their price and output policies. Such a requirement
would thereby eliminate the continuous transformation of profits into permanent increases in wage costs. In the affected industries it would engender lower prices, greater production,
and increased employment. It would also increase the overall
compensation paid to labor employed in those industries.
In industries in which domestic producers exercise significant market power, a requirement that collective bargaining focus on profit sharing would not conflict with national labor
policy, and at the same time it would further national antitrust
policy. Such a requirement would also be consistent with the
goals of allocative efficiency underlying the nation's free trade
policies, and it would further other national goals concerned
with the integration of minorities into the economic life of the
nation.
A requirement that collective bargaining focus on profit
sharing does not conflict with national labor policy in industries
in which employers possess significant market power, because
unions in those industries do not need hourly wage agreements
to coordinate employer behavior in their product markets. In
those industries in which employers possess market power, a
union controlling industry-specific labor necessarily participates
137. For analyses of the patentee royalty strategy, see D. GIFFORD & L.
RASKIND, supra note 126, at 236-38 (1983); Baxter, Legal Restrictions on Exploitationof the Patent Monopoly: An Economic Analysis, 76 YALE L.J. 267,
280-99 (1966); Priest, Cartels and Patent License Arrangements, 20 J.L. &.
ECON. 309, 326-30 (1977).
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in the employers' exploitation of that power. Indeed, by entering into profit-sharing arrangements with producers possessing
market power, a union can more fully exploit its own power in
the labor market. The union can, if it so chooses, maximize the
aggregate return to labor.
Profit-sharing agreements between producers and unions
further the goals of the antitrust laws because those agreements reduce the restrictive effects on the product market that
result from the combination of union control over the labor
supply and employer power in the product market. As previously indicated profit-sharing agreements transform what is essentially a double monopoly into a single monopoly. As a result
they exert a depressing effect on price and an expanding effect
on production.
D.

THE WAGE BARGAIN IN SWEDEN

In Sweden 1 38 unions representing all manufacturing workers periodically bargain about wages with all manufacturing enterprises as a group. Similarly, a coalition of unions
representing white-collar government employees negotiates
with the government as employer.13 9 As a result of these periodic negotiations, the parties usually agree to a straight percentage wage increase that affects all industries across the
board, regardless of their relative profitabilities.
This Swedish practice possesses several characteristics different from its American counterpart. The workers of the
more profitable industries in Sweden do not share in the extra
profits of those industries as they do in the United States. In
the United States, part of General Motors's profits, for example, are captured in the wage bargain and thereafter become
part of that company's labor costs. In Sweden the above average profits of Volvo remain with the company, and the labor
costs of Volvo remain on par with those of other manufacturing
enterprises, or at least are not subject to periodic upward differential readjustments. Because Swedish industries do not transform above average profits into labor costs, their labor
negotiations do not carry the potential of burdening Swedish
138. Swedish unions pursue a "solidaristic" wage policy with the goal of obtaining equal compensation for workers performing the same work regardless
of the productivity of the industry in which they are employed. See Flanagan,
Efficiency and Equality in Swedish Labor Markets, in THE SWEDISH ECONOMY
129, 131-32 (B. Bosworth & A. Rivlin eds. 1987).
139. Id. at 129.
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enterprises with labor costs that impede competitiveness and
expansion.
Because the parties periodically increase wage rates at a set
percentage applicable to all industries, wage bargaining could
not affect the comparative advantage of any industry for purposes of international trade, even if Sweden allowed its currency to be freely traded.140 In contrast to the United States,
the Swedish system protects efficient industries initially possessing a comparative advantage from losing that advantage in
labor negotiations. Efficient and successful industries that produce above average profits do not bargain with industry-specific
unions about wages for the next contract period when some of
those above average profits will be transformed into higher labor costs. Because Sweden follows a policy that fosters uniform
or converging wage rates across all industries, 1 1 efficient industries could not lose their trading advantages in industry-specific
collective bargaining, even if Sweden decided to allow its currency to be freely traded.
Sweden's policy of fostering a convergence of wage rates
denies workers in prosperous industries a share in the prosperity of those industries-a result contrary to the American tradition. This nation could learn from Sweden, however, without
abandoning its own traditions. By adopting a labor policywhere it is most needed-that would permit workers to share
in the profits of prospering industries without suffocating those
industries with ever-increasing hourly wage costs, this country
could obtain the market advantages of the Swedish system.
This Article contends that this policy is most needed in those
areas of the United States economy in which oligopolistic industries bargain with unions controlling the industry labor supply.
Transforming substantial parts of labor's return in such industries into profit sharing would permit workers in prosperous
industries to participate in their employers' prosperity without also destroying their employers' comparative trading
advantages.
140. Sweden's currency does not freely float on the international currency
markets. Rather, it is pegged to a basket of currencies, of which the United
States dollar is a major ingredient. Because its currency does not freely float,
the effects of wage adjustments on the international trading position of Swedish industry are not the same as similar adjustments would be on United
States producers.
141. See, e.g., Sweden's Economy: The Nonconformist State, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 7, 1987, at 21, 21-22, 25 (describing Sweden's policy of reducing wage
differentials between industries).
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THE RIGIDITY OF THE WAGE BARGAIN

THE INSENSITviTY OF WAGES TO FALLING DEMAND

Various writers have observed the so-called "stickiness" of
labor costs: prices do not fall in response to adverse economic
conditions as rapidly as does demand for products. In response
almost all industries adjust to falling demand by laying off
workers, rather than by lowering the wages of employed
workers.
This phenomenon is intimately related to the politicalbusiness cycle that has existed at least since World War II.
Business profits invite labor demands for higher wages. When
business turns unprofitable, employers adjust through layoffs
rather than wage reductions. Hourly wage rates remain at the
higher level engendered by the boom that preceded the recession. When the government stimulates demand-as it generally
must-to end a prolonged recession, the stimulus must engender production from firms bearing the high labor costs created
in the earlier boom. The setting of wage rates thus proceeds in
a rachet-like manner: wages almost always increase and never
decrease, and recessions are ended by demand stimuli sufficiently great (in nominal dollars) to induce production at the
wage rate set during the next preceding period of prosperity.
This state of affairs has given rise to a variety of new insights in economic theory. Monetarists have shown how unemployment in high-wage industries may give rise to inflation
when government authorities increase the money supply sufficiently to restore demand for the industries' products adequate
to cover costs. 14 This state of affairs has given rise to the rational expectations school of analysis, so named because all the
actors can anticipate the stages of the scenario. The rational
expectations school points out that, because participants can
predict the stages in advance, government intervention becomes less effective as more and more participants predict that
intervention.
B. PROFESSOR WEITZMAN AND THE "SHARE ECONOMY"
Professor Martin L. Weitzman has recently argued that
substantial societal benefits would accrue from altering the
conventional arrangements under which employers pay work142. See, e.g., A. ALCHIAN & W. ALLEN, EXCHANGE AND PRODUCTION: COMCOORDINATION, AND CONTROL 490 (2d ed. 1977); R. GORDON,
MACROECONOMICS 192 (1978).
PETITION,
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ers a fixed hourly wage. 1 43 He advocates a wage system in

which workers take a substantial part of their renumeration as
a percentage of an index reflecting employer output. Such an
index could be gross receipts, gross profits, net profits, or another indicator varying directly with output.'"
Weitzman argues that under the current convention, wages
are fixed but employment is left in the discretion of the employer. When demand for the employer's product falls, employers reduce output and lay off workers. Weitzman points out
that the labor contract could be arranged differently so that
wages, rather than employment, reflect reduced demand.
Weitzman believes that a restructuring of the labor contract by unions and employers in this manner would ease the
effects on workers of changes in demand. Workers employed
by firms faced with a declining demand for their products
would incur a slight wage reduction rather than substantial layoffs. The unemployment that accompanies shifting demand
patterns would be transformed into adjustments in remuneration. Workers, Weitzman argues, would find these adjustments
more bearable than job losses.
Weitzman also argues that significant macroeconomic effects might be produced by a practice in which firms reacted to
negative shifts in demand by reducing wages rather than by
laying off workers.' 45 This manner of adjustment by a large
proportion of the manufacturing firms would minimize the negative effects of their adjustments on overall purchasing power
and dampen the extremes of the business cycle. 1'
Weitzman recommends that employers and unions switch
from the typical labor contract that provides a fixed hourly
wage to one that allocates to labor a substantial share in gross
receipts, gross profits, net profits, or other index of output.
Construction of the labor contract in these terms would reduce
the marginal cost to the employer of hiring an additional
worker to an amount less than the average cost of its preexisting workers. The result is an impetus to employers to hire additional workers, expand production, and absorb reductions in
demand by cutting prices rather than by cutting production and
laying off workers.
143. M. WEITzMAN, THE SHARE ECONOMY:
(1984).

144. Id. at 3, 84-85.
145. Id. at 107.
146. Id. at 105-07.
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Although Weitzman adverts only incidentally to the seniority system that engenders conflict of interests among workers, 14 7 his recommended "share contract" nonetheless avoids
the negative effects of that interest conflict: if employers adjust
to falling demand by reducing wages rather than by laying off
workers, they treat all workers alike. By contrast, if employers
adjust through layoffs, they leave unaffected the workers with
the greatest seniority. In avoiding the internal worker conflict
of interest produced by the seniority system, Weitzman's proposal also avoids the negative effects of these conflicts upon output. Weitzman's proposal thus is a device for stimulating
employment, production, and profits, even in the face of falling
demand.
Weitzman, however, does not explore a number of problematic features of his proposal. Because the employer's marginal cost of employing an additional worker is less than the
average cost of the workers already employed, the proposal
contemplates that in every industry in which workers receive
above average compensation, that compensation will be subject
to a process of continuous erosion. Every new worker hired
lowers the compensation of the workers previously hired. The
industry reaches the theoretical limit of production expansion
only when its compensation equals compensation in all other
industries. Although unions are free to negotiate about profit
sharing, their power to affect the product market would be
taken away from them, even in competitively structured
industries.
Weitzman's proposal is not dependent upon the market
structure prevailing in any industry, nor is it designed solely to
reduce or eliminate the restrictive effects that employer market power has upon employment and compensation. Under his
proposal labor could not maximize its return in a competitively
structured industry: because Weitzman's proposal would prevent industry-wide unions from imposing a fixed, hourly wage
rate, they could not impose set labor costs upon all sellers.
Share contracts would radically alter the constraints upon producers in competitively structured industries. Union control
over labor supply would no longer be converted into monopoly
price-output restrictions in the product market for the benefit
of workers. 148 Although his proposal would produce a result in
oligopolistically structured industries similar to that proposed
147.
148.

Id. at 103, 107-09, 116, 133.
See supra notes 67-86 and accompanying text.
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in this Article, Weitzman's proposal would substantially reduce
the return to labor in competitively structured industries whose
labor supply is controlled by an industry-wide union. Rather
than attempt to maximize labor's return, Weitzman intends to
achieve full employment at a market-determined labor rate
more rapidly than present labor conditions permit.
Unlike Weitzman's more grandiose proposal, this Article
accepts as national policy the right of industry-wide unions to
exploit fully whatever power they can muster in their industryspecific labor markets. It asks, however, that in oligopolistic industries-in which unions cannot exercise power in the labor
market independently from employer power in the product
market-unions exercise power for the benefit of industry labor as a whole. In context this means that union bargaining
strategy must be modified to seek compensation in the form of
profit sharing. This limited modification of union prerogatives
would benefit not only industry-specific labor, but employers
and the public as well.
Although Weitzman's concerns differ from those set forth
in this Article, his recommendations are consistent with those
made here. His analysis, therefore, provides grounds additional
to those made here for pursuing labor law reform.
VIII. LABOR NEGOTIATION AND THE PUBLIC
INTEREST: THE LARGER PERSPECTIVE
Fifty years ago Justice Stone wrote in a now famous footnote in United States v. CaroeneProducts that a "more searching than normal" judicial inquiry may be required in reviewing
statutes directed against "discrete and insular minorities" for
whom the normal protections provided by the political
processes were absent. 4 9 Since then the Supreme Court has
been sensitive to the plight of groups unable to use the political
process effectively. The preceding discussion has made it abundantly clear that the collective bargaining processes minimize
the inputs of workers with the least seniority and effectively
exclude other workers from those processes altogether.
Unions are unresponsive to two groups of workers: those
who are not, but could be, employed in an industry, and those
who are employed but have the least seniority. A union has a
necessary propensity to trade jobs for higher wages for its
members. American labor legislation is premised upon the
149.

304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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view that such a trade-off is not inherently objectionable. Society, however, has never seriously questioned whether limits
should be set to the extent of that trade-off or under what circumstances limits should be set. Once a union sets its wage
goals (and therefore implicitly accepts concomitant employment limitations), it has no occasion to listen to those who
would have filled potential jobs that are traded away before
they arise. Likewise, when it sets wage goals, the union has
necessarily decided to trade away some jobs held by its own
members with the least seniority.
The first group of workers-those who never become employed in the industry--obviously never participate in the
union decision-making process. The second group-workers
with the least seniority-nominally participate in the union's
internal processes, but the seniority system infects those
processes by making them unresponsive to these marginally
protected workers. When a union makes decisions that maximize the aggregate economic benefit to labor as a whole, it can
justify the trade-off as compatible with the intentions of the
Congress that enacted the Wagner Act. Yet when the trade-off
of jobs for higher wages reduces the aggregate economic benefits to labor and shrinks the number of higher-paying employment opportunities for minorities, it becomes more difficult to
justify. 5 0 The unresponsiveness of union processes to the two
identified classes of workers then stands as a naked assertion of
power by some workers to benefit themselves by imposing disadvantages upon their colleagues. 151
150. This Article argues that the seniority system tends to skew union deci-

sion making toward a strategy that results in reduced employment in concentrated industries and that the burden of this reduced employment is borne to a
significant degree by minorities. Whether or not significant numbers of minority workers are protected against layoffs by the seniority system is a question this Article does not address. For the view that many minority workers
are protected by the seniority system, see R. FREEMAN & J. MEDOFF, WHAT
Do UNIoNs Do? 134-35 (1984).

151. Commenting on the substantive results of union organization, Professor Epstein sees collective bargaining resulting, inter alia, in wealth redistribution from unorganized workers to organized workers. Asserting that "[t]o
make union members wealthier is to make poorer.., the nonunion workforce
and the poorer members of the general population," Epstein questions "the
moral case for treating union members, as such, as the favored class of wealth
redistribution." Epstein, supra note 1, at 1362. But see R. FREEMAN & J.
MEDOFF, supra note 150, at 150-61 (asserting that nonunion workers in large
firms and in firms threatened by union organization benefit from unionism).
Although this Article proceeds from a different premise, Epstein's description
of the redistributive effects of organization provides a background to the procedural issue discussed in the text. The law should impose some limits on the
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The legal system cannot escape responsibility for this result. This nation has established a labor policy that encourages
wage-employment trade-offs to be made through processes that
exclude two peculiarly vulnerable classes of workers. 5 2 Congress enacted the NLRA to improve the economic status of
workers, but the Act's mechanisms are flawed. Under its structure employers must bargain on wages and working conditions,
including seniority, with an organization primarily responsive
to its most senior members. This structure not only fosters the
union's replication of a producer monopolist's exercise of market power, it skews union bargaining strategy towards positions
more restrictive than those taken by a market monopolist.
When these restrictive effects reduce the overall economic returns available to labor, reform becomes necessary.
No major change in labor law is required to remedy this
flawed process. The basic objective of the Wagner Act-to improve the economic conditions of workers through mechanisms
involving worker participation--can be achieved while remedying this flawed procedure. What is required is a slight shift in
the bargaining posture of labor unions in those situations in
which employers possess significant power in the product marpower of the principal beneficiaries of labor legislation to exclude others from
those benefits.
152. In Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986), the Court
showed some awareness of how a seniority system predisposes union decisionmaking processes against junior workers. Ironically, in that case the Court's

ruling protected the seniority of certain (white) teachers under the Michigan
Teacher Tenure Act. Id. at 283-84 (plurality opinion). Their seniority had
been threatened by provisions of a collective bargaining contract governing
layoffs and designed to preserve minority faculty representation. Id. at 270-71.
Those provisions mandated that "at no time will there be a greater percentage
of minority personnel laid off than the current percentage of minority personnel employed at the time of the layoff." Id. at 270. These contract provisions
were characterized by Justice Marshall in dissent as a "compromise [that]
avoided placing the entire burden of layoffs on either the white teachers as a
group or the minority teachers as a group." Id. at 299. Writing for the Court,
Justice Powell ruled that a majority composed of the most senior teachers
could not waive the tenure rights of their less senior colleagues:
The petitioners before us . . . are not "the white teachers as a

group." They are Wendy Wygant and other individuals who claim
that they were fired from their jobs because of their race. That claim
cannot be waived by petitioners' more senior colleagues. In view of
the way union seniority works, it is not surprising that while a
straight freeze on minority layoffs was overwhelmingly rejected, a
"compromise" eventually was reached that placed the entire burden
of the compromise on the most junior union members. The more senior union members simply had nothing to lose from such a
compromise.

Id. at 281 n.8 (plurality opinion).
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ket. In those situations domestic labor would benefit overall by
a union shift toward seeking increased compensation primarily
through profit-sharing arrangements rather than through increases inhourly wages.
IX. REDEFINING THE ANTITRUST LABOR
EXEMPTION
A shift in bargaining toward profit-sharing objectives in
those industries in which employers possessed substantial market power could be achieved through reformulation of the antitrust labor exemption. This Article proposes a redefinition of
the antitrust labor exemption that will exclude, prima facie, the
combination of union control of the industry-specific labor supply with employer power 1 53 in the product market. Under this

redefinition of the labor exemption, courts would presume that
agreements between oligopolistic or monopolistic employers
and labor unions possessing power over the industry labor supply fell within the scope of the antitrust laws. As previously argued collective-bargaining agreements negotiated in hourly
wage terms would produce unduly restrictive effects in these
industries. Because collective bargaining agreements employing a profit-sharing method'5 would not produce the doubly restrictive effect on the product market of an hourly wage
agreement, proof that the agreement employed the former
measure, or otherwise avoided excessive restrictive effects on
the product market, would rebut the presumption. Once the
153. The existence of employer power in the product market should be no
more difficult to establish in this context than in other circumstances in which
the establishment of market power is a necessary condition to proof of an antitrust violation. See, e.g., Northwest Wholesale Stationers v. Pacific Stationery
& Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 291 (1985) (relevance of dominant position to illegal boycott). Market power in the product market should be presumed when
that market is highly concentrated. Cf. United States v. General Dynamics
Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 497-504 (1974) (statistics regarding market share and concentration are primary indicators of market power). Finally, the merger
guidelines of the United States Department of Justice provide a workable
means of identifying high levels of concentration. See U.S. Department of Justice 1984 Merger Guidelines § 3.11(c), 49 Fed. Reg. 26,823, 26,831 (1984), reprinted in 2 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 4490, 4493 at 6879-14 (June 14, 1984).
154. Under this approach the precise definition of profits could be left to
the parties. The purpose of substituting profit sharing for hourly wage measures of compensation is to eliminate the disincentives to output expansion that
the latter measure engenders. Whether the parties decided to include or to exclude extraordinary gain within the scope of profit sharing would be a matter
that the law could ignore. Under either alternative the employer's incentive
to increase output would remain, and both employer and employees in the aggregate would benefit from increases in output.
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presumption was rebutted, the labor exemption would then apply. The antitrust laws, in short, should intervene in the bargaining context just enough to preclude agreements that
restrict the product market more than is necessary to maximize
the aggregate return to labor.
Imposing a duty on the parties to employ the least restrictive alternative is, of course, a traditional antitrust approach.1 55
For the reasons stated in this Article, this least restrictive alternative would require labor unions to bargain with oligopolist
employers for increased compensation measured primarily in
terms of the percentage of profits allocated to labor. This type
of bargaining avoids the doubly restrictive effects of monopoly
pricing by a powerful input supplier and a powerful output producer and maximizes the interests of employers, the public, and
workers in the aggregate in that context. Under the reformulated labor exemption proposed, the Department of Justice,
employers, or adversely affected workers themselves would
have standing to institute civil suits to invalidate collective bargaining contracts which fell outside the labor exemption.
It would be both unnecessary and impractical, however, to
require that unions and employers negotiate the entire compensation package in profit-sharing terms. Employers could provide workers with a portion of their compensation calculated in
hourly wage terms if the workers so desired, without detracting
from the economic benefits of profit sharing. Thus an employer and union could agree upon a percentage division of the
firm's profits, with a proviso that workers would receive a guaranteed minimum calculated in hourly wage terms; the effect of
such an agreement on the employer's price-output policies
would be the same as without the proviso. If workers found
this form of agreement more acceptable, no policy reason exists
for opposing it.
The antitrust labor exemption is composed of a so-called
statutory exemption and a nonstatutory exemption. Because
the nonstatutory exemption applies to union-employer agreements, it is the nonstatutory exemption which most urgently
requires redefinition. And because the nonstatutory definition
is a judicial creation, the courts have the power to redefine it.
This Article accordingly proposes that the courts redefine the
nonstatutory labor exemption as it applies in concentrated industries. That judicial redefinition will, of course, require the
courts to formulate and use criteria of concentration, but they
155. See Campbell, supra note 1, at 1054 & n.283.
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are capable of such tasks, as their decisions applying section 7
of the Clayton Act demonstrate. In concentrated industries the
exemption should be judicially redefined to apply only to those
collective-bargaining agreements that avoid the doubly restrictive effects produced when employers enter into agreements
with a union controlling the industry labor supply and those
agreements effectively set worker compensation under an
hourly wage standard. As noted above, agreements measuring
compensation increases by percentages of profits avoid those
doubly restrictive effects.
Justice Black's opinion in Allen-Bradley contained dicta
suggesting that a union which coerced an employer into anticompetitive behavior by striking might be protected by the
statutory exemption contained in section 20 of the Clayton Act
so long as the employer capitulated to the union demands without entering into an agreement. 56 Black's suggestion provides
a theoretical means for a union determined to seek compensation solely under an hourly wage measure to achieve that goal,
even if the nonstatutory exemption were redefined as proposed
here. This dicta, however, is based upon an unduly literal reading of section 20. That section is intended only to immunize
strikes and other means of labor warfare, not to permit unions
to achieve goals that would fall outside of the nonstatutory exemption if they were reached through agreement.
To put to rest doubts about whether section 20 would provide a path for a union controlling the industry labor supply to
evade the goals of the redefined nonstatutory exemption proposed above, Congress should redefine the labor exemption by
legislation. That legislation would deny an antitrust exemption
to collective bargaining agreements between a union controlling industry labor supply and employers in concentrated industries that used hourly-wage measures to set compensation
above a set minimum. A labor exemption redefined by legislation could speak with a degree of precision that would evade
the courts. Such legislation could embody definitions of concentrated markets, control of industry labor supply, and compensation agreements that are effectively hourly wage
agreements and those that are not. Because it would resolve all
doubts about the effects of section 20 and because it could speak
precisely to all of the technical questions involved in a revision
of the labor exemption, a legislative revision of the entire antitrust exemption is preferable to a judicial revision of the non156.

See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
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statutory exemption. Until Congress is able to act, however,
courts can give the best effect to the intentions that Congress
manifested in the antitrust laws, the labor laws, the employment acts, and the civil rights statutes by redefining the labor
exemption in the manner proposed in this Article.
CONCLUSION
Antitrust laws further consumer welfare by preventing uneconomic restrictions on output. In the NLRA, Congress
sought to give workers a means for participating in the deteruination of their compensation through collective bargaining
and for sharing in increasing returns to capital. The almost
universally observed seniority system, however, creates organizational incentives for labor unions to skew their bargaining
goals in a direction that benefits a core body of high-seniority
workers, thereby creating undue disadvantages for other workers and the public. When these skewed bargaining goals affect
negotiations between a union controlling the industry labor
supply and employers in an oligopolistically structured industry, the result is conflict with the consumer-welfare goal of the
antitrust laws and a less than maximum return to labor.
This Article proposes that courts and Congress redefine
the labor antitrust exemption to apply only to collectivebargaining agreements that do not involve both a union controlling the industry labor supply and employers in an oligopolistically structured industry, unless the agreement utilizes a profitsharing wage structure rather than an hourly-wage standard.
This proposal results in only a slight change in collective bargaining in concentrated industries, a change that would benefit
the overall interests of labor. Moreover, the redefinition of the
antitrust labor exemption would further both the basic goals of
the antitrust laws and the international competitiveness of
United States industry as well as potentially assisting in the
economic advancement of educationally disadvantaged workers.
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APPENDIX
The demand for industry-specific labor is derived from the
demand for the industry's product. The demand for labor by
any firm depends on the net marginal revenue product of labor,
that is, what an additional worker could add to that firm's net
revenues. Because the additional worker will generally require
other inputs (such as raw materials) to produce additional output for the firm, the value of the additional worker's contribution to the firm is the value of the marginal worker's physical
product less the cost of additional nonlabor input employed by
that worker, or the net marginal revenue product of the additional worker.
In the diagram below, the curve DD' represents the demand for the industry's product. Curve BN is the result of subtracting nonlabor inputs (DB) from the demand for the
industry's product (DD'). Labor cost per unit of output could
not exceed the amounts represented by curve BN. A union
controlling industry labor supply would perceive curve BN as
representing the maximum labor cost that could be imposed
upon industry producers corresponding to varying amounts of
industry output. Should the union decide to maximize the aggregate return to labor, it would seek a wage corresponding to
unit labor cost OE. At unit labor cost OE, output in a competitively structured industry would be OL; the total labor cost incurred by the industry would be represented by the rectangle
OLKE; price would be OC=LJ. Employment would be OL
(output) divided by the average physical product produced per
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worker. Wages would be OE (unit labor cost) times output per

worker.
In a monopoly industry, a union controlling the industry
labor supply would be governed by curve BL. Curve BL is the
monopolist producer's marginal revenue curve (DM) less nonlabor inputs (DB). If the union sought to maximize the aggregate
return to labor, it would seek a wage corresponding to unit labor cost OE. At unit labor cost OE, industry output would be
OF; the total labor cost incurred by the industry would be represented by the rectangle OFGE; price would be OA=FI; the
monopoly profits of the producer would be ACHI. Employment would be OF (output) divided by the average physical
product produced per worker. Wages would be OE (unit labor
cost) times output per worker.
Both the aggregate return to labor and the profits to the
producer could be increased, however, if the producer and the
union could find a way to share the larger revenues that would
be obtainable from increased production. If production were
expanded to OL, revenues less nonlabor inputs would be equal
to the amount represented by the rectangle OLKE, an amount
that exceeds the sum of the return to labor (OFGE) plus the
monopoly profits of the producer (ACHI) under the union goals
described in the last paragraph.
One way for labor and a monopoly employer to achieve this
result is for their respective returns to be set in advance as percentages of net revenues (that is, revenues less nonlabor inputs). Under such an approach applied to a (fully unionized)
monopolistically structured industry, the return to labor would
be less than it would be in a (fully unionized) competitively
structured industry, but it would exceed the aggregate return
under an hourly-wage measure. Wages would be less than
under an hourly-wage measure and less than wages in a competitively structured industry, but the union's control of the labor market would ensure that wages would be set at a higher
level than would prevail in a competitive labor market. Moreover, larger numbers of workers would be employed at those
supra competitive wage levels than under the present system.

